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DIMINISHING RETURNS:
Age-Discriminatory Elements in
the Employment Insurance Act
GAILE MCGREGOR*
RtSUMt
En 1996, Ottawa a d6voil6 les rgsultats d'une initiative de rgforme de sgcuritd sociale
sur trois ans. La nouvelle Loi sur 1'assurance-emploi rgduit les taux de prestations,
resserre les conditions d'admissibilit6 et met en place une sdrie de sanctions pour les
utilisateurs frequents. En l'espace d'un an, le nombre de requ6rants a diminu. de plus
de la moiti6. Bien que le gouvernement affirme qu'il 6tait ngcessaire de se serrer la
ceinture pour 6liminer les facteurs non incitatifs au travail, il est vite devenu 6vident
que les modifications ont touch6 de fagon disproportionnge les groupes
d6mographiques dont le non-emploi ne dgpendait pas d'un choix d6libr6. Cet article
se penche sur les implications de ces changements pour l'un de ces groupes, les
travailleurs ag6s. La recherche se concentre d'abord sur les facteurs sociaux et
6conomiques - depuis les lacunes au niveau des comptences jusqu'aux probl~mes de
sant6, en passant par l'agisme -, lesquels rendent sans conteste les personnes fges
extr~mement vulngrables. Elle offre ensuite une analyse systdmatique des aspects
6ventuellement discriminatoires de la ldgislation. Le tout se termine par une recension
du droit jurisprudentiel d'appels d'assurance-emploi afin d'6tablir si ces probl~mes
< th6oriques >) se sont produits dans la pratique et, si oui, de quelle mani~re. I1 se
dggage de ce triple exercice que les travailleurs fggs se trouvent ggngralement
dgsavantaggs par la d6pendance envers des d6cisions g6ngrales et des solutions
rapides. Certains sous-groupes parmi la cohorte - les femmes sous-6duqu6es, les
minoritgs raciales, les immigrants et les handicapgs - se comptent en grand nombre
parmi les laiss6s-pour-compte.
* Gaile McGregor, LL.B., Ph.D., is Director of Social Research for Terraconnaissance Inc., a
London, Ontario consulting firm, and holds adjunct appointments in the Sociology and
Anthropology departments at the University of Western Ontario.
Age-Discriminatory Elements in the Employment Insurance Act
In 2000, the Canadian Human Rights Review Committee came out strongly in favour of
doing away with mandatory retirement. 1 A year later, the Ontario Human Rights
Commission made the same recommendation. 2 Granted, this is not the first time that we
have heard such views from these sources. Every time another mandatory retirement case
comes up, the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) takes the opportunity to
register its invariably negative opinion. The comments in its 1997 Annual Report are
typical. "No doubt there are various ways to adapt ourselves to an aging society," the
author says snappishly, after reviewing a long list of reasons why the present system is
unfair and irrational, "but mandatory retirement hardly seems one of them.... It is high
time this form of discrimination ceased to be protected by the Canadian Human Rights
Act."'3 This time, though, there is evidence that politicians are ready to hear the message.
After a decade of encouraging early retirement to make jobs available for younger
workers, governments in almost all developed regions of the world have begun to realize
the implications of an aging population, increasing dependency ratios, and a radically
declining labour force participation rate for older cohorts. 4 With crass economic motives
weighing in to the debate, it seems only a matter of time before the retirement age is raised
or eliminated altogether.
In the abstract, this development may be seen as a victory against ageism. Offsetting the
triumph, unfortunately, is the fact that for many population subgroups, including -
particularly - women, it is not mandatory retirement which is propelling them out of the
workforce, nor is it the fact that governments and employers have been pushing people
to retire. It is their radically diminished employability after the age of 55 (see Section .B
below), partly because of "real" problems like skills gaps, but even more because of
ageism. 5 Unless steps are taken to counter both the real and the attitudinal handicaps, for
1. Canadian Human Rights Act Review Panel, Promoting Equality: A New Vision (Ottawa, Ont.:
Department of Justice, 2000) at ch. 18(a).
2. Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC), Time for Action: Advancing Human Rights for Older
Ontarians (Toronto, Ont.: OHRC, 2001). In contrast to the Ontario position, the British Columbia
Human Rights Commission issued an almost simultaneous report recommending against such a
change, on the grounds that it would disproportionately affect disadvantaged groups like women. See
A.T. McLaren & M.M. Mannery, Factors Affecting the Economic Status of Older Women in
Canada: Implications for Mandatory Retirement (Victoria, B.C.: BCHRC, 2001).
3. Canadian Human Rights Commission, Annual Report (Ottawa, Ont.: C.H.R.C., 1997) at 58.
4. As an example of recent shifts of thought in at least some pockets within the federal superstructure,
see Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC), Evaluation and Data Development, Lessons
Learned: Older Worker Adjustment Programs (Ottawa, Ont.: HRDC,1999); also the 1999 report of
the Standing Committee on Human Resources Development on older workers, Looking Ahead: An
Interim Report on Older Workers. For a taste of international perspectives on this subject, see
Alexander Samorodov, Ageing and Labour Markets for Older Workers, Employment and Training
Papers #33 (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1999).
5. Space precludes any substantial consideration of this issue. As a small indication of the extent of the
problem, however, one might note that in a survey of federally run Human Resources Centres, 91%
of respondents with an older client mix agreed, strongly or moderately, that employers discriminate
against older applicants. Susan Underhill, Victor Marshall, Victor & Sylvie Deliencourt, Options
45+ HRCC Survey: Final Report (Ottawa, Ont.: One Voice, 1997) at 30. For a range of perspectives
on ageist attitudes among employers, see Martin M. Greller & Linda K. Stroh, "Careers in Midlife
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many of the individuals who share this kind of disadvantage a higher retirement age will
just mean a longer period of frustration, humiliation, and economic deprivation.
Much of the legislation designed to protect the interests of workers either ignores or
exacerbates the problems of older cohorts. In some cases the differential treatment is quite
explicit. Most notable in this respect is the fact that the human rights statutes of four
provinces - British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Ontario, and Newfoundland - prohibit
discrimination in employment on the basis of age only between the ages of 18 or 19 and
65.6 This initial exception enables further distinctions such as the exclusion of those past
the normal age of retirement from the notice and severance requirements in the Ontario
Employment Standards Act (ESA). 7 In other cases, such as the federal Employment Equity
Act8 (EEA), the problem is one of omission. Despite the very general language in its
preamble ("The purpose of this Act is to achieve equality in the workplace so that no
person shall be denied employment opportunities or benefits for reasons unrelated to
ability"), as it presently stands the EEA covers only women, aboriginal peoples, persons
with disabilities, and members of visible minorities. 9 More pernicious than any explicit
exception, on the other hand - if only because of its invisibility - is the disadvantaging
of older workers through the adverse impact of facially neutral rules and practices.
In a report on age discrimination released in the spring of 2001, the Ontario Human Rights
Commission recommended "THAT all levels of government [should] evaluate laws,
policies and programs to ensure that they do not contain age-based assumptions and
stereotypes and that they reflect the needs of older persons."10 The present article arises
from just such an initiative - a study funded by the Law Commission of Canada on
systemic age discrimination in what is arguably the most critical legal and practical
resource for un- or under-employed older workers, the employment insurance regime." I
and Beyond: A Fallow Field in Need of Sustenance" (1995) 47 J. Vocational Behav. 232; Wendy
Loretto, Colin Duncan & Phil J. White, "Ageism and Employment: Controversies, Ambiguities and
Younger People's Perceptions" (2000) 20 Aging & Soc. 279; Harvey L. Stems & Suzanne M.
Miklos, "The Aging Worker in a Changing Environment: Organizational and Individual Issues" (1995) 47
J. Vocational Behav. 248; Philip Taylor & Alan Walker, "The Ageing Workforce: Employers' Attitudes
towards Older People" (1994) 8 Work Employrmt & Soc. 569; Philip Taylor & Alan Walker, "Employers
and Older Workers: Attitudes and Employment Practices" (1998) 18 Ageing & Soc. 641; Susan
Underhill, Aging Workers in the Workplace: A Canadian Perspective (Ottawa, Ont: HRDC, 1999).
6. With similar implications, the Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6. contains an
exception for termination of an individual who has reached the "normal age of retirement" for his or
her profession (s. 15(1)(c)).
7. O.Reg. 327(2)(g), s. 57.
8. S.C. 1995, c. 44.
9. Considering the substantial evidence that older workers are collectively disadvantaged as much or
more than the enumerated groups when it comes to hiring and promotion, it may well be possible to
apply the principles enunciated in Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, 156 D.L.R. (4 h) 385, in
respect of the omission of sexual orientation from the province's human rights code to establish that
their exclusion from the protection offered by this statute is not only discriminatory but unjustified.
10. Time for Action, supra note 2.
1I. The findings of this study, which looked at administration and implementation issues in the El system, not
just its legal concomitants, may be found in Unemployment Protectionfor Older Workers: A Case
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Legislation
For most people, the defining moment in the recent history of the Canadian unemployment
insurance system was the coming into force in 1996 of the strategically renamed
Employment Insurance Act 12 (EL4), with its more rigorous eligibility criteria and radically
diminished entitlements. (See Table 1 below.) In fact, the EL only gave official
recognition to a change of direction which had been in the wind for at least three years.
Amendments made to the old Act in 1993 and 1994 in response to recessionary fiscal
pressures had already quietly set in motion a campaign to reduce program costs. True,
some technical elements in the new legislation - like the switch from a weeks-based to
an hours-based formula for calculating threshold eligibility - were innovations. Also true,
the extent of the reductions increased rather markedly. The general trend toward belt-
tightening, however, was already well underway before mid-decade. What made the E/M
seem like a departure was less what it contained than the way it was framed.
Table 1: A comparison of entitlement parameters before and after 1996*
OldUl 7 El
Entrance requirement
General 12-20 weeks (min 15 hours or 420-700 hrs (equiv. to 12-20 weeks of
$163/week) 35 hrs/week)
New entrants/ 20 weeks 910 hours
re-entrants
Weekly insurable Maximum Insured Earnings (MIE) of No restriction; all hours, all earnings
earnings $815/week; min $163 or 15 hours/week count up to an annual maximum of
$39,000 ($750/week)
Benefit level
Measurement of Average over most recent 12-20 weeks Last 26 weeks earnings divided by
insurable earnings of work number of weeks worked OR last 26
weeks earnings divided by minimum
divisor (14-22)
Benefit rate
for most claimants 55% of earnings (see above) up to MIE 55% of earnings (see above) up to MIE
low income claimants Dependency Rate: 60% (if own Family Supplement: top-up equal to
with children earnings 50% of MIE) CTB to maximum benefit rate or 65%
(if household income $24,921)
Reduction based on n/a Intensity Rule: 1% decrease in benefit
past use rate for every 20 weeks regular benefits
collected in 5 years, to min of 50% of
earnings (rule eliminated in 2001)
Length of Claim
Weeks of benefits Schedule based on insurable weeks of work and regional unemployment rate
Range 14-50 weeks 14-45 weeks
Study of Systemic Discrimination in a Statutory Regime (2002) [unpublished, archived at Law
Commission of Canada].
12. S.C. 1996, c. 23.
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Clawback
Payback of benefits Threshold of $63,570 (1.5 x MIE); 30% If weeks of regular benefits in last 5
above a total rate of payback; max of 30% of benefits years 20; threshold of $48,750 (1.25 x
collected MIE); 30% rate of payback, max of
30% or benefits recovered
If weeks of regular benefits in last 5
years 20; threshold of $39,000 (MIE);
50-100% rate of payback (100% if 120
weeks); max of 50-100% of benefits
recovered
*Adapted from Martha MacDonald, "Restructuring, Gender and Social Reform in Canada" (1999) 34 J Cdn
Studies 57 at 64-65
In 1995, then-Minister of Human Resources Development, Lloyd Axworthy, released
a Green Paper entitled Jobs and Growth - Improving Social Security in Canada. Nine
supplementary papers provided more detailed information about the current system
and about the options set out in the primary document. Much was made of the fact
that this was not an agenda cast in concrete; it was a menu of widely varying
possibilities to be adjudicated through public discussion. 13 The illusion of consult-
ation was fostered by the fact that changes - many of which were already in place -
were packaged as two alternative approaches, one involving a radical restructuring of
the system, the other modifying current arrangements. Underlying all the substantive
proposals, however, was a set of axioms that formed a centrepiece to the initiative.
Overly generous UI (it was claimed) acts as a disincentive to work. Because of this
unintended psychological effect, people become trapped in cycles of dependency. The
only way to help them permanently is through a kind of tough-love regime focussing
on active employment measures rather than passive support. The priority for the
government, therefore, should not be to make unemployment painless, but to promote
self-sufficiency by improving employment development services such as counselling,
training, wage subsidies, and job creation. 14
13. Lloyd Axworthy's preamble to the Green Paper stands as a prototype in this respect. "Improving
Social Security in Canada is a paper designed to give Canadians an opportunity to participate in the
... rebuilding of our social security system.... My hope is that Canadians will respond to this
invitation in an open, thoughtful and constructive way.... My commitment is to listen to and work
with all Canadians." HRDC, Jobs and Growth-Improving Social Security in Canada (Ottawa, Ont.:
HRDC, 1995) at 5. The weightier supplementary documents reinforced the illusion. "This paper is
part of a series of Supplementary Papers which are being released to provide Canadians with more
detailed information about the current system and the options outlined in the Discussion Paper. This
material is intended to provide a deeper understanding of the issues and to encourage more informed
participation in the debate." HRDC, "Preface" in From Unemployment Insurance to Employment
Insurance (Ottawa, Ont.: HRDC, 1994) np.
14. The government's own policy statements do not put it quite so bluntly, of course. The idea of
removing disincentives is kept largely in the background. In the documents intended for popular
consumption, the emphasis is all on how much is going to be done to help people make themselves
more marketable. The chapter on "Working: Jobs in the New Economy" in the summary version of
the Green Paper, for instance, begins: "The best social security is having a job. This chapter looks at
how federal programs can help by: Improving employment development services such as
counselling, training and work incentives for the unemployed...." (at 10). It goes on to list the "tools"
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While this is not the place to embark on a full scale critique of either the scientific
soundness of this thinking or the policy that drove it,15 it is perhaps worth mentioning
that, whatever its viability in the U.S., where it was spawned, there has been little
empirical support for the disincentives theory on this side of the border. Confuting
the predictions of behaviour change implicit in the tough-love scenario, studies
undertaken by the government's own researchers after the new system was launched
have revealed that reducing benefits did not reduce durations of unemployment spells,
did not noticeably affect the number of quits at the point that eligibility was estab-
lished, and had only a minor impact on job search intensity. 16 Notably, these
required to meet this objective. Three out of the six have to do with training, and a fourth talks of
better counselling about training. The fly in the ointment is the fact that, as will be discussed later in
the paper, the objective of improving training opportunities is fundamentally irreconcilable with the
uber-objective of cutting costs.
15. The fact is, the whole theoretical edifice is based on a premise about human psychology which is
neither questioned nor proven, that is, that most people, given the chance, would prefer not to work.
The most blatant - and crassest - version of this usage encountered by this writer was in Thomas
Lemieux & W. Bentley MacLeod, UI: State Dependence and Unemployment Insurance (Ottawa,
Ont.: HRDC, 1995). Although their only evidence is the statistical datum that "first time use of the
[UI] system increased the probability of future use", these researchers use intentional language
throughout their paper as if there were no other way to account for the phenomenon other than
claimants deliberately taking advantage. "For people with lower incomes, UI provides another
inducement to reduce their labour supply and to work on a part-year basis.... When a new
government program is introduced, individuals adjust their behaviour.... [T]he speed of behavioural
response to policy changes is likely to be very asymmetric, depending on whether a program is
increasing or decreasing in size. When a program is made more generous, more people are expected
to use it. As with any other 'profit' opportunity, it takes time for people to learn about a new policy
and adjust to its parameters. In keeping with our finding that first-time use tends to increase future
use, these people were unaware of the benefits of the system prior to their using it and used it less
than they might have had they been better informed" (at 30-3 1). Further down they refer to "persons
... choosing to cycle in and out of the system" (at 31, emphasis added). Nowhere in this article do the
authors consider obvious alternative explanations for the positive correlation between use and future
use, that is, that there are no jobs, that a high proportion of the population in question lacks the kinds
of skills that would get them into more permanent employment in the first place, and/or that losing
employment damages one's employability quotient and makes it more likely that one will have to
settle for the kind of unstable work that increases the odds of more unemployment in the future.
Given the disparaging tenor of this line of analysis, it is hard to resist the suspicion that what we are
seeing is just a recycling of common classist assumptions about the laziness and dishonesty of the
poor.
16. These particular findings derive from Stephen R.G. Jones, U1, Effects of Benefit Rate Reduction and
Changes in Entitlement (Bill C-I 13) on Unemployment Job Search Behaviour and New Job Quality,
Unemployment Insurance Evaluation 14 (Ottawa, Ont.: HRDC, 1995); L.N. Christofides & C.
McKenna, U1, Employment Patterns and Unemployment Insurance, Unemployment Insurance
Evaluation 6 (Ottawa, Ont.: HRDC, 1995); and P.-Y. Crdmieux et al., U, Unemployment Insurance
and Job Search (Ottawa, Ont.: HRDC, 1995). For a more comprehensive discussion of the topic, see
Miles Corak, Unemployment Insurance, Work Disincentives, and the Canadian Labour Market: An
Overview, Research Paper No. 62 (Ottawa, Ont.: Statistics Canada, Analytical Studies Branch,
Business and Labour Market Analysis Group, 1994). After conducting a full review of the research,
Corak, a Senior Research Economist with the Analytic Studies Branch who, ironically, had himself
contributed significantly to the earlier disincentives literature, concluded, obviously somewhat to his
own surprise, (a) that UI had probably not influenced unemployment in the country nearly as much
(2003) 18 Journal of Law and Social Policy
discoveries did not stimulate any major rethinking among policy makers. This is
hardly surprising. Whatever its shortcomings in respect of its humanitarian
pretensions, El reform was eminently successful in respect of its "other" objective -
the objective of saving money. Thanks to the much tightened eligibility requirements,
coverage under the new Act was reduced by more than half, from 74% in 1989 to 36%
in 1997.17 Thanks to the reduction in payouts, within five years of the leaner, meaner
regime, the accumulated E1 surplus had topped $28 billion. 18
This brings us to our present topic. As gratifying as it may be for the government, for
people concerned with social justice issues, the El surplus is a negative, not a positive
indicator. 19 And not just because it looks like a tax grab. The real problem is that the
pain is not evenly shared. What emerged very quickly once the new system went into
effect was that those hardest hit by the cuts were the very groups who, due to economic
disadvantage and reduced employability, needed the assistance the most.20 Older
workers have arguably been the hardest hit of all, especially where age comes on top
of other grounds of discrimination. The purpose of this paper is to examine exactly
what it is in the legislation that is disproportionately problematic for such individuals.
Before turning to this task, however, it is useful to consider a few of the factors that
make the cohort unusually vulnerable in the first place.
as had been supposed, and (b) that while the so-called disincentives may have affected particular
minorities, they had very little effect on the majority of recipients (at 2).
17. Originally compiled by Statistics Canada from the monthly Employment Insurance System data file
provided by HRDC, these figures were reported in a 1999 Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) booklet
entitled Left Out in the Cold: The End of Ul for Canadian Workers. A roughly contemporaneous
Applied Research Branch working paper, An Analysis of Employment Insurance Benefit Coverage
(Ottawa, Ont.: HRDC, 1998), using different methods of calculation, gives the coverage rates for the
pertinent years as 83 and 42. Numbers aside, the more interesting contrast between these two
publications is in their tone. The CLC paints the result as outrageous; the government publication,
despite revealing that the decline was just as bad as critics claimed, is nonchalant and dismissive.
18. This figure is taken from the HRDC Performance Report for the period ending March 31, 2000.
19. Not surprisingly, the most persistent and strident critics were those whose constituencies had the
most to lose from the changes. Labour and women's organizations were particularly outspoken. See,
for instance, the National Association of Women and the Law's Submission to the Standing
Committee on Human Resources Development, The Federal Social Security Reform: Taking Gender
Into Account, (Ottawa, Ont.: NAWL, 1994), and the Canadian Labour Congress's Submission to the
Standing Committee on Human Resources on Bill C-12: The Employment Insurance Act. (Ottawa,
Ont.: CLC, 1996).
20. Data compiled by academic researchers for a cross-national comparison of social assistance regimes,
for instance, revealed that the impact of mid-nineties UI changes on household income was
concentrated very disproportionately in the lowest income deciles. Lars Osberg, Sadettin Erksoy &
Shelley Phipps, "The Distribution of Income, Wealth, and Economic Security: The Impact of
Unemployment Insurance Reforms in Canada" in S.P. Jenkins, A. Kapteyn & B.M.S. van Praag,
eds., The Distribution of Welfare and Household Production: International Perspectives
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) at 231- 45.
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B. The Constituency
Not much has been written about the specific impact of EI reforms on older claimants.
Most critics focus on the ramifications for (1) displaced workers, (2) the least
educated, (3) women and/or (4) low earners.2 1 Fortunately (at least from the standpoint
of this article) much of what they say is also applicable to the older cohort. As I have
detailed elsewhere, 22 displaced workers and the uneducated are significantly
overrepresented among 45-64-year-olds. Because of their penchant to retire earlier
than men, women are underrepresented numerically in the group, but offsetting this
is the fact that the effects of gender disadvantage are magnified with age. The earnings
picture is harder to get at. Though there is evidence that replacement jobs in later life
typically provide only a fraction of prime-age earnings, 23 the effects of this are muted
by the increasing polarization we see in late career, especially (though not solely)
among men. A study reported in a 1997 HRDC research paper shows men in the highest
earnings quintile making twice as much - almost $40,000 more - as those in the next
highest quintile, and almost ten times as much as those in the lowest. 24 Obviously this
split makes aggregate figures unreliable. If we subtract the well-off minority, though,
it is clear that the older workers category again includes a disproportionate number of
low earners. This means that negative impacts delineated for any of the other
disadvantaged groups, from declines in coverage to higher premium burdens, may also
be extrapolated to the older cohort.
Shared problems, on the other hand, are only the tip of the iceberg for this particular
constituency. Even without additional sources of disadvantagement like gender or
21. For a sampling of such work, see Ken Battle, "Transformation: Canadian Social Policy Since 1985"
(1998) 32: 4 Soc. Pol. & Admin. 321; Canadian Labour Congress, Left Out in the Cold: The End of
UI for Canadian Workers (Ottawa, Ont.: CLC, 1999); Randall Ellsworth, "Squandering our
Inheritance: Re-forming the Canadian Welfare State in the 1990s" (1997) 12 J. L. & Soc. Pol'y 259;
Yvon Godin, The Human Face of Unemployment Insurance (Ottawa: New Democratic Party, 1998);
Martha MacDonald, "Restructuring, Gender and Social Security Reform in Canada" (1999) 34 J.
Can. Stud. 57; National Council of Welfare, A Blueprint for Social Security Reform (Ottawa, Ont:
National Council of Welfare, 1994); NAWL, The Federal Social Security Reform, supra note 19;
Lars Osberg et al., "The Distribution of Income, Wealth, and Economic Security", ibid.; and Jane
Pulkingham, "Remaking the Social Divisions of Welfare: Gender, Dependency, and UI Reform"
(1998) 56 Stud. Pol. Econ. 7. For a more general review of potential negative impacts, see James
Arenburg, "From Unemployment Insurance to Employment Insurance: A Primer for Advocates"
(1997) 12 J. L. & Soc. Pol'y 107.
22. For details and sources of unreferenced information presented in this section, see Gaile McGregor,
"A Fact Sheet on the Economics of Aging", (2002, Law Commission of Canada), online:
<http://www.lcc.gc.ca/en/themes/pr/oa/mcgregor/toc.asp>.
23. Just as an indication of this, according to a 1999 study of older worker adjustment, the average
annual earnings from employment after layoff was $1 1-12K for those laid off in the 45-49 year old
age group, $8-9K for those in the 50-54 year old age group, $3-4K for the 55-59 year old group, and
$.5-2K for those 60-64 years old. These figures represent drops ranging from about 50% for the
youngest subgroup to over 90% for the oldest one. HRDC, Lessons Learned: Older Worker
Adjustment Programs, supra note 4.
24. Ross Finnie, Earnings Dynamics in Canada: Earning Patterns by Age and Sex in Canada, 1982-
1992, Research Paper R-97-1 IE (Ottawa, Ont.: HRDC, Applied Research Branch, 1997) at 33.
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education deficits, there are structural features of older worker unemployment that
make individuals in this category generally more vulnerable than younger claimants.
While space constraints make it impossible to provide a full discussion of these
features, the following capsule, synthesized from data compiled as part of the Law
Commission study (see note 22), will give the reader at least a sense of the context
against which the adequacy of the El provisions must be assessed.
The position of older cohorts has worsened drastically in recent decades. This is not
widely realized. Most people still think of older workers as being protected by their
experience and seniority. In fact, Statistics Canada figures on comparative
employment patterns show not only that older workers have faced escalating layoff
rates during the past quarter century relative to younger cohorts, but that, once out,
they have a far more difficult time reentering the labour force. While the highest level
of unemployment is still among persons 15-24 years, the duration of unemployment
increases significantly with age. Duration for men 45+ rose from 18 weeks in 1976 to
32 in 1985 to 35 in 1994, compared with 17 weeks for men 15-24. Duration for 45+
women has traditionally been lower than for men, but has been increasing at a faster
rate. Duration rates for all older workers rose by 67% between 1976 and 1998,
compared with a 47% increase for all ages. In 1993, approximately 25% of men and
17% of women 45+ who were unemployed had been so for more than a year, compared
with 16% of unemployed men and 12% of unemployed women aged 15-24. In 1998,
the incidence of long-term unemployment among older workers was twice that in the
labour market as a whole.
Exacerbating the longer jobless spells is the aforementioned decline in the quality of
replacement jobs. It is not just a question of lower earnings - a more important factor
is the lower hours. It is notable that between 1976 and 1998 the number of older
workers in part-time jobs increased by more than 70%, roughly one and one half times
the rate of increase for all ages. Although some of this is a matter of choice, 15 to 20%
of the change in mode of participation is estimated to be involuntary. In 1996, 41% of
employed men and 27% of employed women 45-69 who were working part-time
would have preferred otherwise. The rate of self-employment also rises with age.
Again some of this is elective, especially among better educated males. For the
swelling number of women and blue-collar workers in the category, however, the shift
is more likely to reflect a lack of viable alternatives. For both voluntary and
involuntary contingent workers, the financial and other penalties may be considerable,
since the vast majority ofjobs in this class, besides being low paying, are characterized
by short tenure, irregular hours, no benefits, and a great deal of uncertainty.
Adding a final fillip to the picture, there is every reason to believe that these data, as
bad as they are, actually underrepresent the problem. Much has been made of late, for
instance, about declines in the participation of older workers. In 1996, employment
rates for Canadian men 55-59 and 60-64 were only 67% and 41% respectively.
Comparable figures for women were 45% and 22%. The average retirement age in
Canada is now under 62. Generally this is seen as a positive phenomenon. Offsetting
all those media images of happy seniors basking on beaches, however, is the fact that
many people who retire before 65 do not do so voluntarily. Studies have reported that
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an absolute majority of men 60+ who become unemployed are unable to return to
active labour force participation. In the U.S. approximately one-third of all careerjobs
have ended by the time the incumbent is 55, and about one-half have ended by age 60.
It is clear from such indications that many older persons move into retirement through
the absence of alternatives. Displaced workers - workers who have lost jobs which
cease to exist - are particularly vulnerable in this respect. According to a mid-nineties
report excerpted on the HRDC website, among 55-64-year-olds, 52% of those losing
jobs due to displacement were unable to find reemployment. It is also notable that
older people are significantly overrepresented (almost 2:1) in the discouraged
category of unemployed workers. Victor Marshall speculates that if these people were
factored into unemployment statistics, the real unemployment rate for 55+ workers
would be over 23%.25
Considering these special problems, it is clear that, even above and beyond the normal
disadvantage for high-needs subgroups within the older cohort, an insurance scheme
geared to the average is likely to have particular or at least increased shortcomings
with age. The most noteworthy of the potential hot spots for older workers are
reviewed in the next section.
II. POTENTIAL FOR ADVERSE EFFECTS
Sections III through IX of the EM deal with technical, financial, and administrative
aspects of the system, and with special applications. While these areas are not without
their own hot spots - the appeals system, which I have discussed elsewhere, is
particularly notorious in this respect 26 - for the purposes of the present paper I have
limited my examination to the core elements of the program, income support
(unemployment benefits), and employment assistance services (employment
benefits).
A. Part I Unemployment Benefits
1. Calculating Eligibility and Benefit Levels
There are three elements that have to be considered in calculating an individual's
entitlement under the EL4. The first is the entrance requirement, setting out the
minimum length of time that an applicant must have been employed during a
qualifying period (usually 52 weeks); the second is the measure of insurable earnings,
which determines the benefit level; the third is the allowable length of claim, based
on entry hours. As can be seen on Table 1, changes made in the EL4 of 1996 raised the
bar on all three of these axes. The entrance requirement was increased from 12-20
minimum-15-hour weeks to 420-700 hours (the equivalent of 12-20 35-hour weeks)
for regular claimants, and from 20 weeks to 910 hours (the equivalent of 26 35-hour
25. Victor Marshall, "The Older Worker in Canadian Society" in Ellen Gee & Gloria Gutman, eds.,
Rethinking Retirement (Vancouver: Gerontology Research Centre, Simon Fraser University, 1995) at
54.
26. See "Anti-Claimant Bias in the Employment Insurance Appeals System: Causes, Consequences, and
Public Law Remedies" (2002) 15 C.J.A.L.P. 229.
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weeks) for new entrants and re-entrants (i.e., claimants who have had less than 490
hours of insurable work during the 52 weeks preceding their qualifying period). The
basis for calculating earnings was changed from 12-20 weeks of work to a flat period
of 26 weeks. The maximum length of claim was reduced from 50 to 45 weeks. All of
these changes adversely affect older workers. I will be talking about the first two areas
later. For now, let me merely point out the obvious fact that any reduction in the length
of time for which support can be provided is going to impact disproportionately on
claimants who face particular barriers to unemployment (whether because of real
detriments, like low education, or attitudinal ones like discrimination) such that their
durations ofjoblessness are longer than average. As I have already noted, there is ample
statistical evidence that significant subgroups of older workers fall into this category.27
Having said this, I must add that focussing on specific developments like changes to
eligibility requirements and claim lengths, as most recent commentators have tended
to do, obscures what is probably the most profoundly discriminatory aspect of this
legislation. Exacerbating the effect of changing any individual component in the equation
is the formula that dictates the way these components will be combined. You may have
noted that the foregoing summary of parameters was framed in terms, not of fixed figures,
but of maximums and ranges. The variable determining where, within a stipulated range,
a given claimant will fall is the employment rate in different regions of the county. In high
unemployment areas, unemployed individuals require fewer hours to qualify, and get
more weeks of support for any given number of hours, than unemployed individuals in
low unemployment areas. As of August 10, 2001, for instance, an El claimant in Ontario,
where the unemployment rate was 5.7, would need a minimum of 700 hours to qualify,
and with that minimum, would be eligible for only 14 weeks of support. In Quebec, right
across the border, where the unemployment rate was 8.6, the same person would need
only 595 hours and would be entitled to 18 weeks worth of benefits.
Now obviously there is nothing wrong with the principle behind this variance - if a
person has a diminished chance of finding work quickly, it seems only fair that s/he
should be given more time to do so. What is unfair, however, is using geography as
the only basis for calculating chances.28 Regional unemployment is not the only or
27. It is not only the partisan critics who make this particular point. The phenomenon is well
documented by government analysts. See, for instance, David Gray & Gilles Grenier, Jobless
Durations of Displaced Workers: a Comparison of Canada and the United States, Working Papers
W-97-16E (Ottawa, Ont.: HRDC, Strategic Policy, Applied Research Branch, 1997); Doug
Hostland, Structural Unemployment in Canada: Some Stylized Facts, Research Paper R-96-1E
(Ottawa, Ont.: HRDC, Analytic Research Branch, 1995); Darren Lauzon, Worker Displacement:
Trends, Characteristics and Policy Responses, Research Paper R-95-3 (Ottawa, Ont.: HRDC,
Applied Research Branch, 1995). A 1998 analysis by HRDC's Applied Research Branch Strategic
Policy Division notes that, of those unemployed individuals who lost eligibility within the past year
because they exhausted their benefits, more than 40% were over 45. HRDC, An Analysis of
Employment Insurance Benefit Coverage, 1st ed. (Ottawa, Ont.: HRDC, 1998) at 62.
28. To frame the discussion in terms of objective criteria, like fairness or rationality, as I have done here,
is misleading in at least one respect. The impetus for selecting a regional scheme was political, not
logical. One of the most perennial questions about UI/EI over the years has been whether it should
be viewed primarily as an insurance scheme or as a means of income transfer. The income
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even the most important determinant of re-employability. Just on the statistical
probabilities, a white, Canadian-born, 35-year-old male with a college degree living
in Quebec is significantly more readily employable than a high-school-educated
52-year-old female Jamaican immigrant from Ontario. The more axes of
disadvantagement that are added to the mix, moreover, the lower the chances. In this
last example, for instance, if the Jamaican woman were also disabled, her chances of
re-employment would be just about nil. As a group from the Canadian Centre for
Policy Alternatives pointed out as far back as 1989, a reasonable program would be
one that treated all relevant variables equally.29 From the standpoint of the purposes
and principles articulated for this regime by its own authors, it would clearly make
more sense to base eligibility and entitlement calculations on a sliding scale of
employability that took into account not only regional economic conditions but
systemically disadvantaging demographic and experiential factors. Since older
workers as a group suffer both more numerously and more substantially from such
effects, one could argue that the omission of some such provision is in itself adverse
effect discrimination.30
redistributional alternative, unsurprisingly, has been fought for mainly by the have-not parts of the
country. What is somewhat more remarkable is how successful this faction has been in blocking
change. Much of this may be attributed to the happenstantial geographic distribution of
parliamentary seats. "[Observers have] noted the strength of regional party caucuses over the years
in lobbying Cabinet on behalf of regional interests," notes Geoffrey Hale. "MPs from regions of
chronically high unemployment - Quebec, Atlantic Canada, Northern Ontario, and Northern
Manitoba - accounted for well over half the membership of the Liberal caucuses of 1974-79 and
1980-84. and just under half the Progressive Conservative caucuses between 1984 and 1993"
("Reforming Employment Insurance: Transcending the Politics of the Status Quo" (1998) 24 Cdn.
Pub. Policy 429 at 438). Some of this leverage would be lost after the 1993 election, but the
pro-transfer caucus would still have enough clout in the mid-nineties to force the would-be reformers
to soften their anti-disincentives measures. The continued use of a region-based formula for
calculating variable benefit and eligibility levels is one of the most visible signs of this phenomenon.
29. "Conceptually [the approach] is based on the proposition that people who live in regions of lower
unemployment have an easier time finding a job than people who live in higher unemployment
regions. The problem is that regions are not unemployed, people are. And when you look at
individuals ... you find that, while it is generally true that there is a relationship between the rate of
employment and claim duration, there are significant numbers of individuals who fall outside the
general pattern. And it doesn't matter to the individuals who, for perfectly understandable reasons
like age or education, are more likely to become unemployed or ... to have difficulty finding a job
that the average person in his or her region does not. That individual has legitimate needs that a
reasonable program should meet." Gerard Docquier, Hugh MacKenzie & Richard Shillington.
Victimizing the Unemploved: How U! Cuts Will Promote Poverty in Canada (Ottawa, Ont.:
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 1989) at 6.
30. Adding to the inequity is the fact that there is ample evidence that the government knew or should
have known well before the new Act was passed that decreasing benefit duration would
disproportionately affect older workers. "A comparison of indices of incidence and duration reveals that
most of the rise in the unemployment rate since the mid- 1970s is accounted for by longer average spells of
joblessness ... and not by large increases in the proportion of people becoming unemployed." said a 1994
HRDC discussion paper. "Increases in the duration of unemployment spells are particularly affecting
older workers." HRDC, Improving Social Security in Canada The Context of Reform: A Supplementary
Paper (Ottawa. Ont.: HRDC, 1994) at 14. It is also notable that it is generally recognized now that a lion's
share of the El surplus comes specifically from the savings on duration. See, for instance, Marc van
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2. Job Search and Availability-for- Work Requirements
The second potential locus of discrimination concerns what someone is required to
do to retain his or her benefits. Section 18 of the Act stipulates that a claimant may
not collect benefits for any working day for which s/he fails to prove that s/he was "capable
of and available for work and unable to obtain suitable employment". On the surface, this
qualification seems entirely reasonable. What is problematic is the way the El
Commission has interpreted availability. The following passages are taken from sections
10.1.2 and 10. 1.3 of the EI Digest of Entitlement Principles,31 a reference tool
available on the internet detailing the bases on which HRDC makes its claims
decisions.
A person may not be considered available for work unless that person is physically
capable of working. From this perspective, the ability to work is just one facet of the
concept of availability. Similarly, not taking advantage of an opportunity of suitable
employment may indicate that one's willingness to work is doubtful or that there are
limitations on one's availability.
The requirement to personally make reasonable and customary efforts to find
suitable employment is explicitly laid down in the legislation. Availability, therefore,
refers to a dynamic desire to work and not just to an expression of a passive state
towards accepting work. It would not be enough to accept the passive connotation of
the word "available" as it appears in the dictionary. [emphasis added]
Availability for work depends on a willingness to accept any offer of employment to
which one is suited by skill, training, aptitude or experience and on a willingness to
accept working conditions for which there is a demand in the labour market.
[emphasis added]
Availability for work is primarily a subjective matter which must be considered in
the light of a claimant's intention. This can be done by examining statements,
actions, restrictions as well as the concern shown by an individual towards finding
employment. However, it must also be viewed objectively by examining a person's
prospects of employment in relation to the objective circumstances, whether created
deliberately or not, including any limitations caused by partial incapacity,
transportation difficulties, and personal or family constraints. [emphasis added]
The problems relate, not to the letter of these texts, but to the meanings that have been
given to the italicized passages.
"A dynamic desire to work" has been construed as a requirement for a high, continued
level of job-search activity. The expectation is sensible in the early stages of
unemployment. One creates a resume, researches the labour market, identifies and
reaches out to prospective employers, signs up for job clubs, and takes appropriate
Audcnrode & Paul A. Storer, Eligibility for U! Benefits. Take-up of Benefits and the Financial
Liability of the U! Account, Strategic Evaluation and Monitoring Evaluation and Data Development
Evaluation Report I (Ottawa, Ont.: HRDC, 1998). Putting these facts together, it is hard to escape
the conclusion that the government has knowingly chosen to impose a disproportionate share of the
financial burden of the deficit on older Canadians, a constituency with little political clout.
31. Online: <http://www.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/ae-ei/loi-law/guide-digest/main .html>.
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steps to acquire necessary counselling and training. After a certain point, however, the
avenues left to pursue necessarily become more limited. Beyond keeping watch for
new job postings and applying for suitable vacancies, there is not much that one can
do. Continuing to pester the companies and agencies one has already contacted is at
least a waste of time and perhaps even counter-productive. Far from recognizing this
fact of life, the El regime actually increases its expectations of claimants as time goes
on. Long-unemployed individuals must provide more and better evidence of search
intensity than recent entrants. They must also show themselves willing to widen their
job search both categorically and geographically. If there is any reluctance on either of
these grounds, the mere fact that no job is forthcoming may be taken as proof that the
person is not prepared "to accept working conditions for which there is a demand in the
labour market". This approach disadvantages older workers in at least four different ways.
First, some of the individual requirements under the search-broadening head are
disproportionately arduous for older cohorts. Particularly problematic is the fact that
a person may be deemed unavailable for work if s/he refuses to consider jobs outside
the immediate geographic area. Much is often made of the fact that older people are
less mobile than younger ones. There is good reason for this. The older one gets, the
more likely one is to depend on support networks of family and friends, and to play
an essential role in such networks for others. The older one gets, moreover, the less
likely it is that one will have either the financial resources or the physical and
psychological capacity to undertake a major relocation, especially when there is no
guarantee of any better job prospects at the other end. The El regulations specifically
preclude giving any consideration whatsoever to "extenuating circumstances" of this sort.
Second, because of the higher than average duration rates for older people, the group
as a whole faces a greater likelihood of having to make, and to make more,
accommodations of this sort. It is not just a matter of multiplied inconvenience.
Mailing out resumes is expensive. Attending extra job-search counselling sessions or
spending more time at a resource centre will chalk up busfare. If, on top of these
regular expenses, one has to job-hunt or attend interviews at a distance, the
transportation may be more than ajobless individual can afford. The fact that more is
required of long-term than short-term claimants in these areas means that groups
containing a disproportionate number of long-term claimants - like older workers -
face greater average costs, in both pecuniary and personal terms, than those who are
more readily re-employable. Since the hurdles can keep being raised, moreover, it
provides a legally defensible means of getting rid of claimants for whom, through no
fault of their own, the labour market offers no reasonable prospects.
The third problem is less easy to pin down. It is not clear how the "capability"
requirement interfaces with the activity requirement. If an older person were capable
of working but not capable of extensive travel to find or get to such work, would that
mean that s/he would be considered unavailable? The guidelines are extremely fuzzy
on this point. Section 10.4.6 of the Digest says specifically that "[flactors such as a
handicap, advanced age, lack of education or training and very limited knowledge of
the language spoken are not considered as restrictions and should not be held against
claimants in assessing their availability." Countering this, however, section 10.10.6,
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on religious obligations, suggests that a person who is limited by a constitutionally
protected personal characteristic may be expected to "extend availability or to accept
different working conditions or terms of employment" in order to compensate for this
limitation. One is also struck by the implication in section 10.10.3 that a distinction will
be made between a partially disabling condition predating the separation, which will not
be considered as affecting availability, and a recently incurred one which either postdated
or caused the job loss, which apparently will. It is notable that "partial incapacity" was
among the disqualifying factors listed in the passage quoted above, along with
transportation difficulties and personal or family constraints. If these provisions imply
what the Digest seems to suggest, it is almost certainly contrary to s. 15 of the Charter.
The last discriminatory aspect of the "active" job search requirement is its failure to
address or allow for the effects of discouragement. Adding to the normal strains of a
long spell ofjoblessness, older workers forced to expose themselves over and over to
the stress and humiliation of rejection can face seriously increased psychological
risk.32 Thus debilitated, older job seekers are even less likely to be re-employed. From
this standpoint, the policy of escalating expectations may be seen as not only
facilitating but exacerbating the residual effects of ageism.
3. Disadvantages for Non-Standard and Irregular Workers
I have mentioned the increasing number of older individuals involved in non-standard
forms of work. A great deal has been written about the extent to which the E/M
disadvantages such workers, mainly from the standpoint of women. Again because of
the overlap in subgroup characteristics, much of this research is also applicable to
older workers. Because there are a number of discrete problems involved, all of which
are mutually exacerbating, it is impossible to deal comprehensively with this topic in
the space available. For present purposes, I will just briefly touch on the major issues.
a) Hours-Based Eligibility Formula
The switch from a weeks-based to an hours-based entrance requirement 33 does not
affect full-time workers since the minimums add up to the same number of 35-hour
32. While no-one responds well to unemployment, older workers are more than usually susceptible to
counter-productive psychological reactions. Describing the results of a survey of discouraged older
workers carried out in Columbus, Ohio, John Rife and Richard Firth suggest that a sense of
stigmatization leads to a withdrawal of affect. "Participants reported feeling mildly depressed ...
socially isolated and embarrassed, and were experiencing low life satisfaction generally. They also
tended to use a low number of social and employment-related community services" ("Discouraged
Older Workers: An Exploratory Study" (1989) 29 Intntl J. Aging & Human Dev. 195 at 195). It is
notable that such effects are not only not given any weight but generally not even acknowledged by
El appeals adjudicators. In CUB 51628 (Fitas, 2000), for instance, the claimant appealed a
disqualification for not sustaining an active enough job search on the grounds that he was suffering
from stress related to discouragement. "With respect to availability, the claimant stated that it was
virtually impossible to get work in other fields because of his age," the Umpire summarized. "He
stated that he could not attend the scheduled meeting because of stress and the conclusion that these
group sessions could do nothing for him." Although the case was returned to the Board for
reconsideration on other grounds, the ageism argument was not even considered.
33. This formula was ruled unconstitutional by B.C. Umpire Roger Salhany in March, 2001, in CUB
51142 (Lesiuk) on the grounds of its statistically greater adverse impact on women. Predictably,
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weeks as were previously required. For those who work more than 35 hours- primarily
men - the change is beneficial. For those who work less than a full week, however,
whether regularly or on the average, the difference is staggering. Under the UIA an
individual in a high unemployment region with fifteen hours of work per week needed
only 12 weeks of employment to qualify for UT benefits. Now the same individual
needs to work for 28 weeks to reach the 420-hour threshold. In low unemployment
regions the threshold is 700 hours, more than double the previous level. That this
change has a disproportionate impact on groups overrepresented in non-standard
forms of work is self-evident. 34
b) The Domino Effect of Job Instability
As Table I shows, when the EIA was first drafted, against both public and expert
recommendations it contained a provision known as the intensity rule which explicitly
penalized repeat users by reducing their benefits incrementally from 55% to 50% of
earnings and by decreasing the ceiling above which benefits would have to be repaid
through tax clawback. These penalties were repealed as of May, 2001. Despite this,
at least some classes of repeat users still face structural disadvantages, including the
tendency to keep repeating.35 Non-standard workers are very likely to fall into this
category. The key characterizing detriments of non-standard work, in fact, are shorter
tenure and greater instability. Statistically speaking, therefore, a non-standard worker
given its record on El Charter cases, this ruling was reversed by the Federal Court of Appeal in
Canada (Attorney General) v. Lesiuk (2003). 299 N.R. 307, 100 C.R.R. (2d) 255. Leave to appeal to
the Supreme Court of Canada was filed March 7. 2003, [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 94 (S.C.C.) (QL). For a
discussion of this case and of its broader implications within El jurisprudence, see Gaile McGregor.
"Lesiuk versus the Employment Insurance Commission: Fighting for Charter Rights in an Anti-
Charter Environment" (forthcoming, publisher to be confirmed).
34. For an impact analysis from a gender standpoint, see the Umpire's summary in Lesiuk (ibid.) of an
opinion report prepared by Professor Norene Pupo. Chair of Sociology at York University. Casting
an ironic light on the systemic disadvantage illuminated in this case is the fact that the switch to an
hours-based method of calculating eligibility was originally touted by the government as a means of
bringing a significant number of previously ineligible workers into the system. Although some
individuals were. indeed, newly covered under the new approach, their gains were so negligible that
Jane Pulkingham calls it a "'hollow victory". "IThose working less than 15 hours per week under UI
may now have their work insured for the first time, but for many, unless they alter their work
schedule by increasing the number of hours worked per week, they will never actually qualify for El.
A significant proportion (18 percent) of newly insured workers now have to pay premiums but will
never be able to qualify for benefits while working less than 15 hours per week (or 17.5 hours per
week if they are a new/re-entrant). Only 6 percent of newly insured workers stand to benefit through
coverage and ability to qualify in the event of unemployment.... In addition, it would appear that the
premium refund also is being used as a way of removing insurance and coverage/entitlement from
part-timers covered and entitled under the previous legislation. For example, 16% of claimants who
worked part-time and were eligible for UI benefits will not qualify for EI income benefits with
equivalent hours of work. Therefore. a significant portion of part-timers, whether they work less than
fifteen hours per week (newly covered) or between fifteen and thirty-five hours per week (previously
covered), are worse off as a result of the new legislation" ("Remaking the Social Divisions of
Welfare-. supra note 21 at 24).
35. The research cited in notes 15 and 16 may have been discredited insofar as it supports the
disincentives theory. but what remains indubitable is the demonstration that once an individual has
used the El system. s/he has a statistically greater chance of having to use it again.
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has a significantly higher probability of repeated job loss than a full-time employee.
The effects of such work interruptions are obviously exacerbated when there are
problems of re-employability. And notjust because short-timers get less support. If a
person remains unemployed for long enough that s/he has less than 14 weeks of work
in the year preceding her qualifying period - which many older workers do - when
s/he does return to the labour force, according to the provisions of the new Act s/he
will do so as a re-entrant. This means that if s/he falls out of employment again in less
than two years - again, not an unlikely prospect in an unstable job sector - s/he will
need 910 hours of work to qualify, compared to the 420-700 hours required of a regular
claimant. The likely impact of such a change is underlined by the fact, as revealed in
an HRDC evaluation report, that the recipient rates for NEREs (new and re-entrants)
is only half that of non-NEREs. To put it more baldly, only 15% of NEREs reporting
job loss get benefits. 36 (This pattern of escalating disadvantage is undoubtedly at least
part of the reason why so many older workers give up!)
c) Penalties for Low Earners
Low earners, which include many if not most non-standard workers, are penalized by
the EI system both collectively and individually. As a group, low earners not only
indirectly subsidize higher status workers because they are less likely to ever qualify
to recoup what they have paid into the system; with the reduction of the Maximum
Insurable Earnings, they also bear a relatively greater portion of the premium cost.
"Lowering the annual MIE from $43,940 to $39,000 ... redistribute[s] the costs of [the]
program from higher income to lower income workers, and from higher wage
provinces to provinces with a greater portion of their labour force earning lower
wages," says a Canadian Labour Congress Fact Book released when the change was
first proposed.37 It is on the individual level, however, that low earners really feel the
impact of the recent reform. I said earlier that having fewer hours means a shorter
period of support. It also means a relatively less adequate benefit level. The reduction
of replacement rates - from 75% in 1971, to 67.5% in 1976, to 60% in 1979, to 57%
in 1993, to 55% in 1994 - obviously has greater ramifications the less one earns.
Fifty-five percent of the earnings from a half-time minimum wage job cuts a lot closer
to the bone than 55% of the full MIE. This disadvantage has been aggravated for
non-standard workers by the new formula for calculating insurable earnings.
Because of what it reflects about the arcane combination of politics and theory that
went into the design of the current Act, it is worth catching at least a glimpse of the
process by which this formula was derived. Martha MacDonald explains:
Under UI most claimants were entitled to a benefit equal to 55 percent of their
insurable earning during the last 12-20 weeks worked. Working extra weeks for
lower earnings would lower one's benefits, while moonlighting at an uninsured job
36. Shelley Phipps & Fiona MacPhail, The Impact of Employment Insurance on New Entrants and
Re-Entrant Workers, Final Report (Ottawa, Ont.: HRDC, Evaluation and Data Development
Division, 2000).
37. Canadian Labour Congress, Fact Book: An Analysis of Bill C-12, The Employment Insurance Act
(Ottawa, Ont.: CLC. 1996) at 41-42.
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(less than $163 or 15 hours per week) would leave benefits unchanged. El attempted
to remove these disincentives.
While the benefit rate remains at 55 percent ... the effective rate is lower for
many people because of the way average earnings are calculated. The original EI
bill averaged earnings over a fixed period of 16-20 weeks....
.... The use of a reference period in weeks contradicts the attempt to take
account of non-standard work patterns - although eligibility is based on hours, the
benefit level is calculated on weeks. Again non-standard workers, disproportionately
female, are penalized.
Workers with gaps in employment (35 percent of claimants) would also be
penalized by using a fixed number of weeks - an unintended consequence of the
formula. After protest from Atlantic MPs and others the period used was increased
to 26 weeks. Average weekly insurable earnings are calculated by dividing total
earnings in that period by the higher of the number of weeks worked, or the
minimum divisor (the regional EI entrance requirement plus two). The change in the
divisor lowers the penalty on seasonal workers and makes the penalty equal across
regions.
If a person has fewer weeks of work than the relevant minimum divisor, there is
still an incentive to take more work, regardless of the wage level. But if a person has
already worked more weeks than the minimum divisor but less than 26, extra work
for less pay will lower the benefit level.38
From the non-standard worker's perspective, it is the latter paragraph that is most
critical - although, the way it is phrased, MacDonald's explanation actually under-
states the problem. Because the weeks in the Rate Calculation Period have to be
consecutive (s. 14(4)), the averaging can include weeks with reduced or even token
earnings. Obviously this is going to disadvantage people with fluctuating hours. 39
Adding insult to injury, as MacDonald notes in passing, the divisor used as an
alternative to actual weeks is based on the same problematic geographic variable
discussed earlier.
d) The Self-Employment Trap
I have already noted that there is a correlation between self-employment and age.
According to a 1999 Statistics Canada working paper, in 1996 individuals "aged 55+
accounted for 19% of the self employed but only 8% of paid employees. The likelihood
of being self-employed also increases sharply with age. In 1996, 7% of all workers
under the age of 25 were self-employed, compared with 28% among those between
38. "Restructuring, Gender and Social Security Reform in Canada", supra note 21 at 68-69.
39. This rule may already be on its way out. In a news release dated September 21, 2001, HRDC
announced "that on September 22, 2001, it will pre-publish in the Canada Gazette, for consultation
purposes. the possibility of implementing the successful *Small Weeks' pilot project as a permanent
and Canada-wide method of calculating Employment Insurance (EI) benefits." The notice continued:
"This proposed amendment would allow El claimants to exclude low-earning weeks (less than $150)
for benefit calculation purposes and, therefore, encourage people to accept all available work."
While the results must be applauded, it is interesting to note that this decision would seem to have
been based, not on humanitarian or fairness considerations, but on the idea that penalizing "small
weeks" might be a disincentive to employment.
(2003) 18 Journal of Law and Social Policy
the ages of 55 to 64.' ' 40 Whether this is a positive or negative development is obscured
by inconsistencies in the literature on the subject. One much-debated question, for
instance, has been whether the greater number of individuals involved in the sector
are pulled by entrepreneurial enthusiasm or pushed by the inability to find jobs.
Although the bigger picture remains murky,41 recent evidence does suggest that the
pushed rate is higher among own-account self-employed (OASEs) relative to those
who employ others (ESEs), 42 among women relative to men,43 and among blue collar
trades workers relative to managers. 44 It is notable that the former category in each of
these groups has mushroomed during the nineties, the same period during which
older-worker self-employment has increased so markedly.45 While specific research
in the area is lacking, when one considers these data in tandem it seems likely, given
the re-employability problems that we have noted among significant sub-groups of
older workers, that much of the rise in self-employment among individuals over 55,
like the rise in part-time work, may be involuntary. It also seems likely that the pushed
subgroup has a far lower chance of success than retired professionals who start up
consulting businesses.
What does any of this have to do with El? While no single provision seems
discriminatory on its face, two features of the regime work in combination to produce
a potentially disadvantaging result for the "pushed" fraction of older unemployed
workers. First, HRDC actually promotes self-employment through its Self-
Employment Assistance (SEA) program, which provides income support for El-
eligible individuals while they are getting a business up and running. Second, and
counter to this, the EIA specifically excludes self-employed persons from coverage
(S.O.R. 96-332, s. 30(1)). Looking at these ostensibly unrelated items in the context
of the current preoccupation with savings, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that HRDC
is luring people into a course of action with a limited chance of success expressly to
get them off the El rolls. This is at least ethically dubious. Compounding the problem,
moreover, if an El-eligible unemployed person devotes the kind of time to planning
and research that is required in order to get accepted for SEA, and does not get
40. Zhengxi Lin, Janice Yates & Garnett Picot, Rising Self-Employment in the Midst of High
Unemployment: An Empirical Analysis of Recent Developments in Canada, Working Paper
II FOO I9MPE No. 133 (Ottawa. Ont.: Statistics Canada, 1999) at 5.
41. One of the problems is inconsistent evidence on whether and how self-employment is related to the
business cycle. When one looks more closely at the literature, it seems likely, as Lin et al. point out
(ibid.), that there are several mutually interfering factors at work.
42. James Gauthier & Richard Roy, Diverging Trends in Self-Employment in Canada, Research Paper
R-97-13E (Ottawa. Ont.: HRDC, Applied Research Branch, 1998).
43. See Lin et al., supra note 39; Wayne Simpson & Robert Sproule, Econometric Analysis of Canadian
Self-Employment Using SLID, Research Paper 75F0002M no. 98-16 (Ottawa, Ont.: Statistics
Canada, 1998) at 25.
44. This polarization of late-life self-employment was documented in a study carried out by Ekos
Research Associates and reported in Lessons Learned: Own-Account Self Employment in Canada
(Ottawa, Ont.: HRDC, Evaluation and Data Development, 2000).
45. Gauthier & Roy, supra note 42.
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approval, s/he may find him/herself disentitled from benefits on the grounds that s/he
is/was not available for work.46
4. Health-Related Issues
The fourth group of problems can be subdivided according to whether the health
involved is the claimant's own or someone else's.
a) Sickness Benefits
It is well documented (see Fact Sheet, supra note 22) that older workers suffer more
health risks than the rest of the working population. This means that any feature of
the legislation that adversely affects sick people will disproportionately affect older
ones. In addition to the uncertainty around disability noted in the section on job search,
there are three sets of provisions that might be seen as falling into this category. The
first - which is of particular concern given the domino effects noted earlier - is the
fact that minor attachment claimants, meaning claimants who have less than 600 hours
during their qualifying periods, are not eligible for sickness benefits at all. The second
is that chronic, combined, recurring, or hard-to-diagnose conditions sufficient to keep
a person from working, or even to get him/her dismissed, may be viewed as
compromising availability yet not meet the rigorous standard of proof required to
establish an eligible "illness, injury or quarantine" (s. 2 1(1)). Along the same lines, it
is notable that absenteeism, even of the innocent, health-related variety, can be counted
as misconduct in determining whether a dismissal was culpable or not.
The third problem area has to do with the limitations applying to various benefit types.
Sickness benefits have a flat cap of 15 weeks. If a person who would otherwise be
eligible to collect regular benefits is sick longer than this, s/he will be disentitled as
not available. "Stacked" benefits are capped at the length of the overall entitlement.
If a person entitled to 40 weeks of regular benefits is sick for, say, ten weeks of his/her
benefit period, during which s/he collects sickness benefits, s/he is still only entitled
to a maximum of 40 weeks of both kinds of benefits combined. This means that anyone
who gets ill during a claim will have shorter job-searching time than s/he would
otherwise be entitled to. This is obviously going to be a particular detriment for
46. It is notable that an HRDC web document entitled "Venturing Out: Starting a Successful Business"
contains the following warning: "Individuals who may be entitled to receive Employment Insurance
(El) or Social Assistance (SA) benefits, and are not accepted in the Self Employment Assistance
Program. may lose entitlement to those benefits once the decision to start a business is made." The
case law suggests that this is not just a proforma caution. Although the topic was not included in the
sampling of availability issues discussed in section III, the search turned up one case - CUB 50604
(Schmitt, 2001) - in which the claimant was disqualified because he mistakenly thought he had been
accepted for SEA and proceeded to act accordingly, and a second - CUB 51187 (Buors, 2001) -
where the claimant was expelled from the program because he misunderstood the reporting
requirements. "It is apparent that the claimant was very detailed in the manner in which he wanted
the reporting cards explained to him, and he apparently filled them out diligently on the under-
standing he had from the Commission," said the Umpire in this latter case. "It seems ironical that the
very plan which was set up to assist the claimant, because of some misinformation or incomplete
information given to him. now turns out to be a plan which is defeating him."
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individuals and groups who/which face already face special barriers to re-
employment. 47
b) Non-Recognition of Caregiving Obligations
Although caring for a sick spouse or family member is considered as just cause for
leaving employment, as long as the emergency continues the otherwise eligible
claimant will not be considered as available for work. Caring for a sick relative is also
not grounds for extending either a qualifying period (the period during which the hours
required to establish eligibility must be accrued, usually 52 weeks) or a benefit period
(the length of time during which all benefits payable on a given claim must be
collected, also usually 52 weeks). This means that a person who is forced to drop out
of the labour force for any substantial period for reasons of caregiving may (a) lose
the previously accrued hours that would otherwise have made him/her eligible for
benefits, (b) lose benefits to which s/he has already established a claim, and/or (c)
lack recent enough hours to establish a new claim once the caregiving stint is ended.
It may be argued, of course, that since these rules apply to everyone, there is no special
disadvantage for older people. To accept this as a blanket answer is to ignore the fact
that, especially in developed countries, the caregiving responsibilities normally
associated with child-bearing can actually escalate later in life. 48 Not only are a
significant number of older people, especially women, forced to leave employment to
care for ailing spouses or parents but, because of the trend to later child-bearing on
the one hand and longer life expectancy on the other, many middle-aged people find
themselves having to cope with childcare and eldercare at the same time.49 One could
47. Adding poignancy to this situation is the fact that there is evidence that unemployment itself
negatively affects health. "The studies indicate that the unemployed usually suffer from more
physical and mental health problems than the employed population," notes Marcel Bddard.
"According to the [19851 D'Arcy and Siddiquc ... study ... Canadian unemployed subjects are
inclined to be less satisfied (by almost 70%) than employed subjects with their general physical and
mental well-being, and they report more short-term and long-term physical disabilities than workers
do: they are sick almost twice as often, and visit the doctor more frequently. Physicians' diagnoses
reported in D'Arcy's 1986 study indicate that Canadian unemployed workers are 20% to 25% more
at risk for heart disease, chest pain, high blood pressure, and joint pain than the general working
population." The Economic and Social Costs of Unemployment, Research Paper R-96-12E
(Ottawa,Ont.: HRDC, Strategic Policy, Applied Research Branch, 1996) at 16-17.
48. Victoria Velkoff & Victoria Lawson, Gender and Aging: Caregiving (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Census Bureau, 1998).
49. Anne Martin-Matthews offers a variety of statistics hinting at the dimensions of this problem.
"Between 1991 and 1995, the [CARNET] Research Group surveyed over 8.500 employees from
across regions of the country in a series of studies designed to examine the prevalence of 'elder care'
among Canadian workers.... [They] estimated that approximately 45% of the employees who were
surveyed had some measure of involvement in assisting elderly relatives. For most employees, this
involved modest to moderate levels of help.... However, for about 12% of the employees, assistance
to elderly relatives included the potentially more demanding responsibilities associated with the
provision of personal care. Approximately half the employees also had some responsibilities for
dependent children.... Over a 3-year period, 33% of a group of employees with the 'structural
potential' ... for elder care (in that they had elderly relatives) moved from nonactive into active
caring roles.... It is estimated that approximately 9% of caregivers leave paid employment in order to
provide care for an elderly person.... Almost 12% of current employees indicated that they have left
Age-Discriminatory Elements in the Employment Insurance Act
argue that caring for the elderly is just as much of a contribution to society as parenting,
yet only one of these activities is compensated in the EI system. While it might run
counter to the principles of employment insurance to provide direct benefits for active
caregivers, it should be possible, and certainly would be more equitable, if the rules
were changed to enable such people to at least preserve their eligibility in order to
qualify once they are ready to re-enter the labour force.
6. Definition and Allocation of Income
The last problem to be considered in this section is the most purely technical. One of
the few older worker issues to have garnered much public attention was the mid-
eighties decision to begin treating pensions as "earnings" for the purposes of
determining UI eligibility. The principle was given form in what is now S.O.R. 96-332,
s. 35(2): "[T]he earnings to be ... deducted from benefits payable under ... the Act ...
are the entire income of a claimant arising out of any employment, including ... (e)
the moneys paid or payable to a claimant on a periodic basis or in a lump sum on
account of or in lieu of a pension." While it is easy to see why the targeting of pensions
would have the greatest symbolic resonance for government-watchers, 50 what was
actually more problematic for our particular clientele was the related provision that
severance pay and payments in lieu of notice would be treated in the same manner.
Like many of the other problems discussed in the foregoing pages, the threat posed
by this scheme is not readily apparent. The reason for the new rule, according to the
government of the day, was to improve the equitability of the UI system by eliminating
"double dipping" - an aim with which it is hard to argue. If the purpose of
unemployment insurance is to ensure that individuals whose earnings have been
terminated will be provided with an alternative source of income for a reasonable
period in order to job-hunt, then it is at least inconsistent and arguably unfair to use
it to subsidize those who are still receiving pay from their employment. Whether the
transition is funded by an employer or by the public or by a combination of both, the
important thing is that everyone get a comparable adjustment period. Viewed in this
light, the limitation seems unobjectionable. In combination with other sections of the
Act, however, the provision has a negative side effect that has gone largely unnoticed.
Termination payouts are allocated as earnings for an appropriate number of weeks
following the week in which the separation occurs, based on the individual's "normal"
past employment because of family obligations, and slightly over 14% reported that they have
considered leaving their current employers for this reason." "Canada and the Changing Profile of
Health and Social Services: Implications for Employment and Caregiving" in Viola M. Lechner &
Margaret B. Neal. eds., Work and Caring for the Elderly: International Perspectives (Philadelphia:
Brunner/Mazel, 1999) at 2-15. See also Judith Phillips "Working Caters: Caring Workers" in Miriam
Bernard, Judith Phillips, Linda Machin & Val Harding Davies, eds., Women Ageing: Changing
Identities. Challenging Myths (London & N.Y.: Routledge, 2000).
50. It was in response to public pressure on this issue that the government incorporated an exception
(now S.O.R. 96-332. s. 35(7)(e)) providing that pension income would not be counted as earnings if
(1) the claimant had accumulated the necessary weeks of insurable employment to establish a claim,
(2) these weeks had been accumulated ajer the pension became payable, and (3) the pension
payments had continued during the entire period of accumulation.
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rate of pay (S.O.R. 96-332, ss. 36(9) and (10)). The higher the payment, obviously,
the longer this "deemed" extension of wages lasts. The longer it lasts, the longer it
will be before the individual can establish the "interruption of earnings" which is a
prerequisite to a claim. 51 On the surface, this does seem problematic. Because the
qualifying period is extended to cover the extra weeks, benefit entitlement is only
delayed, not lost. If anything, a severance recipient seems better off, as a result of the
increased coverage, than someone who has to begin collecting immediately. The
problem is, until a claim is established, an individual is not only ineligible for income
support, s/he is also ineligible for employment assistance benefits. This means that
s/he will be unable to access special programs or training during the critical early
stages of unemployment. 52 The longer a jobless spell lasts, the more likelihood there
is of stigmatization, psycho-social deficits, and discouragement, all of which decrease
the statistical probability of re-employment. The implications for older workers are
obvious. Of all unemployed individuals, older workers are the most likely to need
retraining in order to achieve re-entry. They are also the most likely to have large
enough severance packages to delay their claims for long periods.
B. Part II Employment Benefits
1. Guidelines for Administering Support Measures
At the centre of the mid-nineties reform initiative, as mentioned earlier, was the idea
of not simply giving people handouts but providing them with the wherewithal to
obtain employment. Section 57(l) sets out conditions for establishing and
administering the programs and benefits by which this objective is to be met. On the
surface, the principles articulated here look benign and even admirable. It is only when
one looks at the end result that one begins to realize that the problem is not in what
they say or prescribe, but in what they allow. Discretion as to obligations is especially
dangerous in a climate of budgetary constraint. It may seem unduly cynical to assume
that a cash-strapped government department is likely to provide as little in the way of
services as it can get away with. The facts, however, suggest that this is exactly what
has happened.5 3 To put my readings of this Part of the Act in context, the following
51. As another sop to public opinion, pensions are also not taken into account in determining whether an
interruption of earnings has taken place.
52. Non-El eligible unemployed persons are not left entirely out in the cold. Under S.O.R. 96-332, s. 59,
the basics supplied under the umbrella of the National Employment Service are "available to all
workers whether insured or not or whether they are claiming unemployment benefits or not". As
spelled out in s. 58, these basics include access to labour market information, counselling,
assessment, job referral, and referral to appropriate social service agencies. They do not, however,
include more substantial kinds of help like wage subsidies, job creation programs, self-employment
assistance, or skills enhancement courses - exactly what high-needs unemployed workers are likely
to need to help them overcome their extra disadvantages.
53. Ironically, given the government's emphasis on educational measures in its mid-nineties discussion
papers, the area which has suffered most from the budget-cutting of the nineties is training. "[Tihe
emphasis [now] is on how quickly the individual can be 're-attached' to the labour force," says
Randy Ellsworth. "Sometimes minimal skills and education upgrading is available. Only in the rarest
of cases is comprehensive retraining or occupational rehabilitation offered." "Squandering our
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discussion draws on the findings of a 2001 field study of front-line agencies involved
in the delivery of employment assistance services in the Toronto area.54
a) Pushing the Quick Fix
Subsection 57(1)(b) provides that programs will be aimed at "reduc[ing] ... depend-
ency on unemployment benefits by helping individuals obtain or keep employment."
On its face this clause reads simply as a restatement of the objectives spelled out in
the original Green Paper. With the pressure to cut costs, however, the highlighting of
dependency reduction has been taken to justify a whole range of policies and practices
detrimental to high-needs claimaints. One problematic tendency, for instance, is the
prioritization of short-term interventions aimed at employment-ready individuals over
long-term interventions such as skills development and training courses. 55 Another is
interpreting availability requirements in such a way as to force people to accept bad
jobs or face disqualification (see Section III.B.2 below). A third, which is obviously
going to have disproportionate impact on groups with high duration rates, is setting
unrealistic quotas for service deliverers that force them to concentrate on clients with
the best prospects, leaving hard-to-place applicants to fend for themselves. 56 This
Inheritance", supra note 21 at 289. Supporting Ellsworth's contentions are the statistics on spending
levels. A research paper by Jennifer Stephen published in 2000 by Advocates for Community Based
Training and Education for Women (ACTEW) under the title "Access Diminished" produced the
following, rather sobering facts: 1) Since 1993, total expenditures for training have been reduced
nationally by nearly 50%; 2) Federal general revenue spending on training in Ontario was reduced
from $764 million in 1995-96 to $79 million in 1997/98; 3) Total federal expenditures on training
declined as a proportion of the overall budget from 83% in 1995 to 28% in 1999; 4) Total federal
and provincial training and employment program/service expenditures in the province went from
$2,491,100 in 1995/96 to $1,768,800 in 1997/98.
54. The results of this study are reported in detail in McGregor, Unemployment Protection for Older
Workers, supra note 11 at Part III.
55. According to HRDC's Employment Insurance 2000 Monitoring and Assessment Report (Ottawa,
Ont.: HRDC, 2000) at 27-29, in 1999-2000 only 32.8% of interventions fell into the long-term
category. Even more tellingly, over the last half decade expenditures on long-term interventions
shrank from 92.5% in 1995-96 (under UI), to 78.2% in 1997-98, to 67% in 1998-99, to 64% in
1999-2000.
56. The quotas reported by our informants in the Toronto study ranged from 70% to 90%, depending on
the service and the clientele. A typical resource centre contract calls for x-number of starts, of whom
85% must complete the intervention and 70% must find employment in a four-month follow up. The
job does not have to be a "good" or a full-time or a permanent one - it merely has to last for a
minimum of ten weeks out of the next 26. Quite apart from the pressures this system imposes on the
front-line workers, the implications for practice are clearly considerable. Faced with losing their
funding if they fail to keep up their numbers, agencies have no choice but to focus their efforts on
the most easily re-employable. While there are no hard data on the phenomenon there is both
circumstantial and anecdotal evidence that at many outlets high-needs individuals are referred else-
where, told that they do not meet the qualifications for the programming on site, or simply not
encouraged to continue. This is one of the areas that was singled out by the Standing Committee on
Human Resources Development as presenting particular problems for older workers. "The results-
based focus established under the LMDAs encourages ... program delivery operators to focus
attention on those who can reenter the labour market fastest and for the least amount of spending....
While the Committee does not object to the emphasis on active measures, it points out the
importance of ensuring that this approach not be pursued at the expense of clients - such as
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phenomenon, which is called "creaming", is not only known but apparently approved
by department officials. The manager of a Toronto Human Resources Centre told me
when I raised the problem in a telephone interview in the fall of 2001 that the emphasis
in the Act on getting people back to work meant that they were required to concentrate
resources on the people who were most capable of getting back to work.
b) Passing the Buck
Subsection 57(1)(c) calls for "co-operation and partnership with other governments,
employers, community-based organizations and other interested organizations".
Subsection 57(1)(d) calls for "flexibility to allow significant decisions about
implementation to be made at a local level". Again none of this sounds particularly
alarming. What it has done in practice, however, is to provide an excuse for HRDC to
download as many of its obligations as possible to the provinces and the private sector,
with only minimal top-down control to ensure either the manner or the extent to which
these obligations are fulfilled. 57 When this policy was first announced in the mid-
nineties, the main focus of critics was on the government's failure to include any
formal equity requirements in its agreements with the provinces. Judging by
outcomes, an even bigger problem - especially given the aforementioned cost-cutting
motive - was the omission of measures to ensure consistency and adequacy of
programming across the country.58 Based on the language of the Act, there is nothing
whatsoever to require either participating provinces or HRDC's own local offices to
provide a particular type or level of service, to operate according to any particular
standard of fairness or adequacy, or to account in any way for its practice beyond
reporting numbers.
That such open-endedness is inimical to user interests may be gauged from the finding
of our field study that the Toronto regional HRDC office, in order to keep expenditures
down, systematically sets limits on employment benefits at levels significantly less
permanently displaced older workers - who cannot be easily reemployed and who need long-term
adjustment assistance." Looking Ahead, supra note 4 at 13.
57. As of this writing, every province and territory with the exception of Ontario has signed a Labour
Market Development Agreement with Ottawa giving it either full or partial responsibility for the
administration of employment support measures. In Ontario, HRDC remains technically in charge,
but the services themselves, from assessment to training, have been contracted out to community and
private sector operators. The problems caused by this fractionation of the system range from poor
communications to cross-regional discrepancies in access. For different perspectives on the
background to and effects of the great nineties downloading event, see Herman Bakvis & Peter
Aucoin, Negotiating Labour Market Development Agreements (Ottawa, Ont.: Canadian Centre for
Management Development, 2000); Gordon DiGiacomo, Federalist Occupational Training Policy: A
Neo-Institutionalist Analysis, Working Paper 2001(2) (Kingston, Ont.: IIGR, Queen's University,
2001); and Thomas Klassen, Precarious Values: Organizations, Politics and Labour Market Policy
in Ontario (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000).
58. When the reforms were first announced, the National Association of Women and the Law claimed
that the changes not only "eliminate national standards for training problems, they also threaten the
existence of training programs altogether for provinces who do not wish or cannot afford to
participate". Bill C-12: An Act Respecting Employment Insurance in Canada: Its Impact on Women
(Ottawa, Ont.: NAWL, 1996 ) at 12. As events have proven, the suspicion one may read into this
caution was fully justified.
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than what the rules allow. Officially, according to information published on the
department's website, training may be approved for up to 52 weeks, with extensions
in exceptional circumstances. Unofficially, a set of guidelines issued to local service
providers in 1999 stipulated that the average training length "should be" 26 weeks. 59
(Obviously this is going to work to the disadvantage of claimants whose outdated
skills or education deficits require substantial remediation. 60 ) Officially, individuals
who have had an active claim within three years are entitled to the same benefits as
individuals with a current claim. Unofficially, the same 1999 guidelines suggested that
the "level of activity" appropriate to active and reachback clients should be 65% and
10% respectively. (Obviously this is going to work to the disadvantage of both
long-duration clients who have exhausted their benefits without finding work and
clients who find themselves jobless again before accruing enough hours to establish
a new claim, an all-too-common occurrence for those who get propelled into non-
standard forms of work.)
c) Promoting Self-Sufficiency
Subsection 57(l)(d.l) stipulates that persons participating in employment assistance
programming must take "primary responsibility for identifying their employment
needs and locating services", and, "if appropriate", share the cost of these services.
What this says, in effect, is that the government is only going to help those who are
prepared to help themselves. 61 Theoretically, this does not seem unreasonable. In
59. The explicit cap was eliminated from replacement Guidelines issued in 2001, but since the reason
given for the loosening up was a temporary budget surplus, it seems likely that constraints will
reappear as soon as unemployment begins rising again. The point, in any case, is not that the Act
requires stinginess, but that it allows local administrations to pursue their own agendas. In Toronto,
the main priority seems to be cost-cutting. It is notable that, as of 1999, Ontario led the provinces in
unpaid benefits "saved", at $235 million. ACTEW, "Access Diminished", supra note 53.
60. When we asked our informants about the "exceptional circumstances" clause in the policy, we were
told that it was rarely invoked because HRDC thinks that everyone - regardless of special needs -
should be treated equally. "They like to spread things around," was the standard comment. Although
the principle does not sound very sinister, what it means for particularly disadvantaged claimants can
be seen in the following quotation from the director of an assessment centre. "They used to be
eligible for four months of Basic English Skills upgrading, then 52 weeks of Skills Training. Some
would qualify for ESL for an additional six months or so. Now, they are only eligible for a total of
26 weeks including English or Literacy training. Often upgrading literacy skills so they can qualify
for skills training and then the actual skills training exceeds the 26-week limit. This also poses a
problem ... because some of the training institutions and particularly the colleges have not adjusted
their schedules to the new eligibility requirements. HRDC only pays for training in one continuous
program, whereas the colleges deliver training through the semester system." The implications of
this last remark go beyond the obvious. Because college courses are generally too long to fit within
the window, skills training provision has been increasingly taken over by commercial operators who
can do continual input and provide condensed scheduling. Leaving aside the question of what the
trend means for course quality, the speeded up format is particularly hard for older workers, whose
best learning modes are performance-based and personalized (see Susan Underhill, Aging Workers in
the Workplace, supra note 5 at 13-14) and whose classroom skills are likely to be rusty.
61. Self-sufficiency was a major theme in the mid-nineties reform initiative. As conveyed by the
government rhetoric, the principle has two distinct faces. We catch a glimpse of this ambivalence in
a section of the Green Paper entitled "From unemployment insurance to employment insurance".
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practice - again - it creates some real difficulties for high-needs claimants by licencing
a minimalist approach to assistance. In Toronto, for instance, applicants are required
to formulate their own goals, develop detailed back-to-work plans, and carry out
extensive research to determine the cheapest and most effective means of acquiring
the requisite skills and knowledge. 62 It is true that they can get assistance in this
endeavour through a network of resource and assessment centres. Given the tight
budgets and high quotas for service agencies, however, the opportunities for
individualized counselling are severely limited. For the most part, programs
emphasize group how-to sessions and electronic information sources. Adding to the
problem is the fact that the people least capable of "playing" the system are also
generally the least capable of designing their own solutions.
The cost-sharing requirement is also problematic for older individuals. Asking
someone in the last decade of his/her working life to exhaust his/her savings and assets
in order to finance reeducation of unknown value is a very different matter than asking
a thirtysomething-year-old to invest in his/her future. The result is that many older
claimants simply fall out of the system, either because of ignorance and incapacity or
because they are afraid of losing the little they have. (Given these problems, it is almost
certainly not coincidental that most of the Toronto agencies specializing in older
workers cater largely to a middle-class clientele. 63)
The lead items in a list of reasons why reform of the system is urgently needed are: "The program
often discourages adjustment" and "The program is easily abused" Improving Social Security in
Canada: Discussion Paper Summary (Ottawa, Ont.: HRDC, 1994) at 12-13, The first of these two
formulations signals the line of thought, discussed in Section I.A, that forcing people out of depend-
ency is doing them a favour. The second has the slightly nastier connotation of claimants ripping off
the system. Usually the suggestion is made somewhat more subtly. ("Society definitely has a
responsibility to provide support for people who are in need and who cannot work. But individuals
also have a responsibility to help themselves" [ibid]) In all cases, though, the underlying implication
is the same: dependency is not only a weakness but a character flaw. This reasoning shows strong
traces of the American ideology that spurred the development of the aforementioned disincentive
theory.
62. The word extensive in this sentence was used advisedly. The form on which clients are required to
record their findings on potential training courses is a three-page legal sized document, divided into
three columns labeled School #1, School #2, School #3, and containing 33 detailed questions about
the cost, content, methodology, facilities, and support services offered in each of three alternative
venues.
63. This phenomenon provides further evidence of what I said earlier about the creaming process being
approved and even encouraged by the department. Of the eight Toronto resource centres funded as a
result of a special 1999 initiative to develop services for older workers, the one that was most
actively pursued by the manager in charge is a workshop for retired managers and professionals
interested in starting consulting businesses. This upscale emphasis is particularly ironic given the
stated rationale for developing these particular services. "We can expect the current pace of
technological and market change to continue, if not increase," said a prospectus issued by the
Toronto regional office in the late nineties. "[Our plan for the Millennium] needs to serve our social
policies and promote an ethics of care to offset a purely fiscal approach to governing. Reliance on
market forces and economic policies alone excludes individuals with needs not met in the
marketplace. In Toronto, this means investing in initiatives for groups most at risk of being
marginalized - persons with disabilities, youth, aboriginal peoples, newcomers and unemployed
experienced workers over 45 years old" (Bridge to a New Millennium: Toronto HRDC Business
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d) Reporting Requirements
Subsection 57(l)(f) stipulates that unemployment benefits must be dispensed "within
a framework for evaluating their success in assisting persons to obtain or keep
employment". Again the problem is not with the base requirement but with the way it
can be - and, according to our research, has been - interpreted. Success could be
geared to job quality or future prospects or client satisfaction. In practice, the
department is interested only in getting people off the rolls as quickly as possible,
even when it is apparent that the quick fix is likely to cause further problems down
the line. Why the short-sightedness? Although there is no hard evidence for this, one
cannot help suspecting that a key factor driving this policy is that most of the people
pushed into bad jobs will never again qualify for benefits. The future will be their
problem, consequently, not the government's. Whatever the reason, it is clear from
HRDC's own documents that there is little concern with the quality or the equitability
of programming - only with its cheapness. It is notable that the sole outcome measures
listed in the department's 2000 Performance Report for assessing success in
facilitating access to employment are "Number of clients ... employed or self-
employed following ... interventions" and "Unpaid benefits ... resulting from ...
claimants returning to work before the end of their benefit period". 64 The bottom line,
in other words, is the number of dollars not paid out to which clients might otherwise
have been entitled.
2. Just-in-Time Thinking
At least some of the problems outlined in the preceding section could be alleviated if
more efforts were made to remedy the educational deficits of older workers before
they become a problem. 65 Theoretically, the new thinking should make this easier. It
is striking that one of HRDC's currently favourite buzz-phrases is "lifelong learning".
In practice, unfortunately, very few of the opportunities suggested by the phrase come
the way of older workers. 66 In part this may be due to the ageist assumption (see note
Plan 1999-2001 at 12). Even apart from the rather smirk-inducing reference to an "ethics of care" in
this passage, the supposed concern for the most needy is more than a little undermined by the finding
of a survey carried out as part of our 2001 field study (see McGregor, Unemployment Protection for
Older Workers, supra note 11 at ch. VI) that, at least in the older worker category, the vast majority
of the programming offered is aimed at the subgroups least at risk of being marginalized.
64. At 11. These provisions take on extra resonance when read in light of the pressure put on clients to
take marginal employment discussed in section A.2 below.
65. Dale Yeatts, Edward Folts, and James Knapp suggest that maintaining training throughout a
worker's career is a major factor, not just in preventing skills from becoming outmoded in the first
place, but, even more important, in ensuring that individuals will be receptive to and capable of
change in later life. "Older Worker's Adaptation to a Changing Workplace: Employment Issues for
the 21 st Century" (1999) 25 Ed. Geront. 33 1.
66. Although the situation has worsened as a result of recent budget cuts, there is nothing new about the
exclusion of older workers from retraining opportunities. Contrasting starkly with what we can infer
about their relatively greater needs in this area, research shows that older workers as a group have
historically received far less in the way of educational upgrading, both from employers and, more
critically for present purposes, from public sources, than other cohorts. According to a Statistics
Canada report on adult education in Canada, participation in non-employer-sponsored job-related
education and training Activities in 1993 (i.e., before the big cuts of the late nineties) was around 5%
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5) that older people are unable or unwilling to learn new skills and technologies. (It
is telling in this respect that the section entitled "Promoting Learning and Skills
Development" in the 2000-2001 HRDC Report on Plans and Priorities is all about
financing "students". 67) In greater part, however, it is an artifact of the drive to prune
services to the minimum. El used to fund workplace training and adjustment
preparation that would help lessen the impact of layoffs when they came. 68 Now it is
made explicit in s. 60(5) of the Act that there is no money for anything but cases of
actual imminent unemployment: "Support measures ... shall not ... provide assistance
for employed persons unless they are facing a loss of their employment." Given the
greater training needs and structural problems of older people - needs and problems
that are not easily addressed in a system designed to favour cheap solutions - this may
be too little, too late.
3. Ban on Appeals
The last problem area in Part II of the Act puts a capper on everything else. The EI
regime offers a rather elaborate appeals system (complaints go from Boards of
Referees to Umpires to the Federal Court of Appeal) for those seeking relief from
what they see as unfair or unreasonable decisions in respect of income support.69
Section 64, however, specifically excludes "employment benefits" from challenge
under this system. This would include everything from denials of applications for
training to assessments of claimant contributions. Especially given the stress that
HRDC puts on accountability in its performance reports, there is no moral or legal
for workers between 45 and 54 and around 2% for those between 55 and 64, compared with 9% for
the 25-34 age group. Adult Education and Training in Canada: Report of the 1994 Adult Education
and Training Survey (Ottawa, Ont.: HRDC, Training and Continuing Education Section, 1997) at 43.
67. 2000-2001 Estimates, Part III - Report on Plans and Priorities (Ottawa, Ont.: HRDC, 2000) at
33-34.
68. One of the most notable initiatives in this area was the early nineties Labour Market Adjustments
Program. As described by Anne Crichton and Lyn Jongbloed, the purpose of this program was to
service communities, not just individuals. "In 1991, a labour market adjustments program was ...
introduced to help small- and medium-sized employers assume primary responsibility for meeting
changing skill requirements.... The program was designed to negotiate partnership arrangements that
would assist in the planning and implementation of human resource development plans, workplace
training and other adjustment measures.... Strategies used would focus on human resource planning,
workplace-based training, work sharing, industrial adjustment services and employment equity
concepts.... Special programs were also introduced to assist communities facing severe labour market
problems to: (1) organize their resources; (2) assess local labour market problems and opportunities;
(3) establish realistic objectives, and (4) formulate, manage and implement appropriate strategies"(Disability and Social Policy in Canada (North York, Ont.: Captus Press, 1998) at 240-41).
Unfortunately, the LMAP disappeared as part of the big downloading event. Now adjustment is the
responsibility of the provinces. Federal funding is theoretically available to help deal with the effects
of larger layoffs, but at least from the perspective of the community, there is no clear policy as to
when this assistance will be forthcoming. Whether HRDC gets involved now depends on each
particular office, said a union official interviewed in the course of the Toronto field study. Some
offices do not want to participate in broad-scale initiatives - their attitude is that they have outlets the
unemployed can visit for assistance; they are not interested in doing anything else.
69. For a description of this system and a discussion of its shortcomings, see Gaile McGregor, "Anti
Claimant Bias in the Employment Insurance Appeals System", supra note 26.
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reason why these matters should be exempted from normal judicial oversight. They
are not tangential to the purposes of the legislation, nor do they remotely resemble the
kinds of policy issues that might attract parliamentary privilege. Most of the unfair
and irrational results obtained from this system can be attributed to local practice, not
official rules. Adding to the absurdity of the situation is the fact that, as mentioned,
these services are now delivered largely by third parties. With the whole process
protected from beginning to end, not only is the claimant deprived of recourse against
the government; s/he is deprived of any avenue, short of expensive private legal action,
by which to obtain a remedy against an incompetent or negligent or dishonest private
operator. Of particular concern to the older cohort, s/he is also deprived of any means
to battle the discriminatory effects of customary practice.
III. A GLIMPSE AT REAL-WORLD IMPACTS
Showing that a piece of legislation has the potential for discriminatory application is
not the same as showing actual discrimination. In some cases - like the Part II
provisions discussed in the last section - the ramifications are evident from field
studies. In others, however, one can only speculate that a rule could disadvantage older
applicants if it were applied in such and such a fashion. One way of gauging the
likelihood of the worst case scenarios is to look at the kinds of problems that surface
in the appeals process. It is beyond the scope of this study to review the entire body
of jurisprudence for age-relevant decisions. (There are, after all, more than 50,000
cases in the corpus at this point.) Given that the whole appeals system is subject to
the rule of stare decisis, however, it seems likely that any reasonably sized slice will
provide a reasonably representative sense of general tendencies. After considering the
alternatives, I decided that my purposes would be best served in the present instance
by focussing on availability for work cases.
Why this topic in particular? Methodologically, the availability jurisprudence is in no
way exceptional. Because eligibility and entitlement cases tend to be focussed on
technicalities, the broader implications of the rulings are, if not less present, at least
less striking. Almost identical principles, however, emerge from cases in the other
major area requiring substantive interpretation, just cause for job leaving. Despite this,
there are at least three reasons why the handling of availability issues is of particular
concern to our target constituency. The first and most obvious is that older workers
are statistically more likely to suffer from progressively degenerating employment.
The second is that the kind of standardized assessment methods set out in the relevant
section of the guidebook are disproportionately difficult for such individuals to meet.
The third is the fact that so many of the concepts used in decision-making in this area
- reasonable and customary efforts to find work, suitability of employment, good
cause for refusal - are amorphous enough to allow for a good deal of subjective
judgment. Why is this a problem? The more room there is for subjectivity in an
implementation process, the greater the likelihood that any biases, whether of the
system or of its administrators, will make themselves felt. 70
70. The observations made in this section were based on a representative sample of CUBs (Umpires'
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A. Selected Case Law
We looked at what the Digest of Benefit Entitlement Principles said about availability
for work requirements in section II.A.2 above. The treatment given to the topic in the
Quick Reference Tool compiled by the EI Commission for the use of Boards of
Referees is considerably more simplistic. Under "Questions to Answer" it lists five
items: 1) Is the claimant capable of work?, 2) Is the claimant willing to work?, 3) Has
the claimant made efforts to find work?, 4) Does the claimant have employment
restrictions?, and 5) Are restrictions "undue" according to labour market information?
Complementing these, it suggests the following four "Legal Tests":
* availability is a question of fact, which should normally be disposed of on the
basis of an assessment of the evidence;
* desire to return to the labour market as soon as possible;
* demonstrating this desire by making reasonable and customary efforts to find
suitable employment;
* remaining free of personal requirements which would unduly limit the
opportunities for work.
Taken on its face, this does not sound like a particularly arduous burden to meet. The
first issue to recognize in approaching this topic, however, is that the court has
typically favoured restrictive rather than liberal approaches in EI cases. 71 (The most
probable explanation for this is that most adjudicators tend to look at the EJA, not as
social legislation, but as a species of fiscal legislation, parallel to tax law.) The second
is that, despite the recurrent emphasis on ordinary language interpretation in the
jurisprudence, the terminology around eligibility requirements has taken on a distinct
- and in some respects rather bizarre - life of its own. The third is that, thanks to
Granger v. Canada (EIC), a seminal and much-cited case dating back to the 1980s,
the letter of the law is generally held to prevail over any extrinsic consideration, from
absurdity of results to evidence of official error.72 A key corollary of this ruling is that
the Commission can never be required to do anything which is not prescribed by law
decisions) totalling around 80 items. This sample was obtained as part of a much broader
investigation of El jurisprudence, reported in McGregor, "Anti-Claimant Bias in the Employment
Insurance Appeals System", supra note 26. Because of the large number of cases there are on the
issue (a search in the El jurisprudence library for "available" in proximity to "work" yielded 8,172
hits), unfortunately, it was not possible to carry out the kind of exhaustive review I was able to do on
more specialized topics like deference and discrimination. Instead, I started with the citations
provided in Karen Rudner, The 2001 Annotated Employment Insurance Statutes (Toronto: Carswell,
2001) under appropriate subject headings, and added to these cases that turned up in searches
because they cited Rudner's selections, plus cases cited in related jurisprudence turned up by other
means. I then culled out technical rulings, decisions with no substantive element, and items dealing
with issues of limited relevance to older workers, like attendance at courses, absence from the
country, and babysitting problems. Although the number seems small compared with the potential
total, on the basis of the overview obtained in the course of this selection process I am confident that
they represent a fairly typical range and distribution of issues and outcomes.
71. For a full discussion of these tendencies, see McGregor, "Anti-Client Bias in the Employment
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or prevented from doing anything which is, even if it has raised expectations to the
contrary.
1. Job Search
The most critical aspect of availability, from an older worker's perspective, is the job
search requirement. Section 18 provides that "A claimant is not entitled to be paid
benefits for a working day in a benefit period for which the claimant fails to prove
that on that day the claimant was (a) capable of and available for work and unable to
find suitable employment." As suggested by the phrase, "fails to prove", the onus is
on the individual to establish that he or she meets these conditions. As Rudner's
commentary in the Annotated Statute makes clear, adjudicators have interpreted the
obligation both literally and stringently.
The claimant's intention to work must be outwardly shown by action; that is, there
must be evidence of the claimant's efforts to obtain work and it may be that the
evidence must be presented....
The claimant can prove availability by showing that he has made reasonable
efforts in the circumstances to find employment. The best proof of a claimant's
availability and concern to find employment is a "reasonable" or "serious and
active", "active" or "serious, continual and intensive" job search. Availability is
perhaps best demonstrated by a record of a systematic job search. An inadequate job
search, or a failure to demonstrate an extensive job search, may lead to a conclusion
that the claimant is not available for work.73
Where do personal circumstances enter into this picture? The Digest, as noted earlier,
takes the position that extenuating factors are irrelevant, but do the courts agree? The
weight of evidence suggests that, for the most part, they do. Rudner ends her summary
with the caveat that "[t]he requirement that a claimant is to be continuously seeking
employment must be interpreted in a sensible fashion. Factors such as ... the age and
health of the claimant should be considered in determining whether the search is
sufficient or adequate. '74 Looking at the case law itself, however, there is little sign
that this is an accurate gloss. While a few cases do give some extra latitude to the
physically handicapped, as long as they can show that their conditions have proven
72. [1986] 3 F.C. 70, 29 D.L.R. (4') 501 (F.C.A.), afftd, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 141, 91 N.R. 63. The specific
question in contention in this case was the all too common one of whether the Commission was
liable for misinformation provided by its employees which was accepted by a claimant to his
detriment. When the issue came before the Federal Court of Appeal, the majority not only endorsed
the Commission position but, in doing so, effectively gave the body blanket immunity from ever
being held to account for its erroneous actions and representations. The rationale offered is a classic
one. "It is beyond question that the Commission and its representatives have no power to amend the
law, and that therefore the interpretations which they may give of that law do not themselves have
the force of law. It is equally certain that any commitment which the Commission or its repre-
sentatives may give, whether in good or bad faith, to act in a way other than that prescribed by law
would be absolutely void and contrary to public order." The law is the law, in other words.
73. Supra note 70 at 98-99. Footnote numbers have been dropped from the passage. For more complete
citations on these principles, see the original.
74. Ibid. at 99.
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commensurate with employment in the past,75 I did not find one where consideration
was given on the basis of age. In the sole example cited by Rudner in connection with
the proposition, CUB 12606 (Chilton, 1986), the Umpire finds for the claimant on the
technical grounds that the Board dealt improperly with the job search evidence. Age
per se does not enter into it.76
This is not to say that age is not recognized at all in this jurisprudence, or even that it
is not recognized as a factor bearing on employability. The problem is what
adjudicators do with such recognition. At best it gleans the appellant some vague
sympathy. In CUB 37834A (Thomson, 1997), for instance, the Umpire goes so far as
to comment that "age is an occupational hazard". As far as "consideration" is
concerned, however, it is notable that he raises the factor only with respect to the
credibility of the appellant's explanation for why her efforts have been fruitless. He
does not suggest that it is a reason for varying the standard. Even this much is
anomalous. More typically adjudicators treat age as an additional reason for doubting
the genuineness of the claimant's commitment. In CUB 19012 (Alexakis, 1990), there
is no sign that either the Board or the Umpire gave a moment's thought to the
appellant's claims that "she had followed the rules of the Commission to the best of
her ability but due to her limited skills and age no one would hire her." Rather, they
simply concluded that she lacked a "genuine intention to find work".
Cases where age is made an explicit issue are rare. This does not mean that the
problems are infrequent; it just means that they are hard to see. Whatever the issue,
the system is going to work against older claimants simply by virtue of its invariability.
I speculated earlier that the escalation of expectations one infers from the Digest would
discriminate against subgroups with longer average jobless durations. There is no sign
in the case law that adjudicators are sensitive to this problem. Not only have they given
general approval to the Commission's policy of demanding a broader and less
restricted job search the longer an individual is unemployed (see next section); the
grace period they allow for an individual to impose geographical, economic, or job
type restrictions, or to hold out for work commensurate with past experience, is the
same - two to three months, usually - regardless of the particular circumstances of
the claimant. 77
75. See, for instance, CUB 4584 (Richard, 1977) and CUB 8465 (Gulutzan, 1983). It is notable that
these cases predated the mid-eighties anti-equity trend marked by Granger (supra note 72). It is
possible that the same circumstances would not generate the same result were the cases heard today.
In CUB 14866 (Lindner, 1991), where the claimant's back problems necessitated "a job which did
not entail sitting or standing for long periods of time, nor any lifting", the Umpire, while
sympathetic, declined to interfere with the Board's finding of fact that he was unavailable.
76. The reason for Rudner's inclusion of this reference, presumably, is that the Umpire himself makes
the comment that "There is jurisprudence to the effect that special circumstances such as age and
health should be taken into consideration in determining whether a claimant's job search can be
regarded as sufficient." He does not provide any specific references, however, and I found little in my
own review of the case law to support such a claim. Certainly it does not represent mainstream thinking.
77. This tenet adds an additional qualification to the earlier statement about umpires giving latitude on
grounds of "health". The treatment of time restrictions is typical. The general rule is that a claimant
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2. Obligation to Take Suitable Employment
Related to job search requirements generally is the more specific requirement that a
person prove that s/he is unable to find suitable employment. The most frequently
adjudicated issue under this head arises where the Commission has referred a claimant
to a job which he or she views as unacceptable for some reason - the pay is not enough
to cover expenses; 78 the hours or conditions are onerous; 79 the claimant is under- or
overqualified;8 0 the job is temporary or trivial, and will interfere with the claimant's
availability for something better on which he or she has a line. 81 If an individual on
benefit refuses or fails to pursue such an opportunity, s/he stands a very good chance
of being disqualified.
Adjudicators do not always find for the Commission in such circumstances, to be sure,
but it seems telling that of the 13 cases of this type that turned up in the sample, only
four were resolved in favour of the claimant. Increasing the risk, moreover, it is not
always the seemingly most compelling reasons which prevail. In one case on the list,
a woman was found not to be justified when she refused a part-time job that would
net her only $16/week once she covered child care and transportation costs. 82 In
another, the employment ruled as suitable involved only 20-24 hours of work per week,
"when and as needed in any of the three stores at different locations", and paid only
half of what the claimant was receiving previously.83 The fly in the ointment in most
of these examples is the fact that suitability has been defined by the courts as an
objective standard, to be assessed on a comparison between the job offered and other
jobs in its class, not on a consideration of the claimant's needs and circumstances.8 4
"The rate of pay was the same for all employees," said the Umpire in CUB 24403
must be available during "normal" business hours. An exception may be made, however, for an
individual with a longstanding disability, particularly if s/he has an established history of this kind of
employment In CUB 20316 (Ti Treault, 1991), for instance, the Umpire allows an appeal against a
disentitlement on the basis that the claimant, whose health was "delicate", "had in fact worked on a
part-time basis for the previous seven years". As this case makes clear, however, the grace allowed
for health-based limitations is no more liberal than it is for more arbitrary kinds of restriction. "[If
the claimant has not found this particular type of part-time employment after a reasonable period of
time, which may vary from case to case, [he or she] must broaden the job search field, no longer
restricting himself or herself to part-time work but seeking full-time employment." For a person who
is physically incapable of handling such employment, a rule like this is a virtual guarantee of a
premature disentitlement.
78. CUB 6192A (Moura, 1982); CUB 24403 (Phung, 1992).
79. CUB 14135 (Popowich, 1987); CUB 17592 (Barbato, 1988).
80. Under- or inappropriately qualified: CUB 16052 (Stephenson, 1988), CUB 18243 (Baleshta, 1994),
CUB 24913 (Adams, 1994); overqualified: 16841 (Moore, 1989).
81. CUB 10113 (Therrien, 1985); CUB 12104 (Koehler, 1986); CUB 15873 (Andrews, 1988); CUB
16748 (Leslie, 1989); CUB 18717 (Pakulak, 1991).
82. CUB 6192/6192A (Moura, 1981-82).
83. CUB 14135 (Popowich, 1987).
84. See, for instance, Canada (A.G.) v. Moura, [1982] 2 F.C. 93 (F.C.A.), which has been much cited for
its assertion, in relation to reasons for refusing work, that "A claimant can act in good faith but still
not have 'good cause' for his or her action".
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(Phung, 1992), considering whether the 57-year-old appellant was justified in turning
down a job involving only three or four hours a day, three or four days a week, and
located a half hour's walk from public transit. "She was aware that the work was
somewhat seasonal, and that hours of work might be irregular, but this was a condition
inherent in the job and did not make it unsuitable from an objective point of view."'85
If the claimant does take an uncertain job, s/he faces equally considerable risks. If s/he
ends up having to quit because the situation is untenable, she may be disqualified for
voluntarily leaving employment. 86 If s/he sticks it out, she may end up getting caught
in the downward spiral described in section II.A.3(b) ("The Domino Effect of Job
Instability"), and losing her eligibility. Even if nothing catastrophic happens, it is clear
from the case law that once one has been pushed into marginal employment, it is very
difficult to extricate oneself. I was struck by the predicament of the claimant in one
of the self-employment cases that turned up in the availability sample. Stanislaw
Piedel was trained as a draftsperson in his home country. Unable to find work in his
profession when he arrived in Canada, he took a job as a delivery man for a pizza
restaurant. When the business went under, Piedel invested in a pizza franchise of his
own. Since he was required to be on the premises only in the evenings, he went back
to searching for a daytime job in his field. At this point, the El Commission disentitled
him on the grounds that he was not available during the normal hours for what was
now considered to be his normal line of work, pizza delivery.87 The message one draws
from this decision adds an ominous undercolouring to the now-common situation
where a skilled worker is forced to take a job as a gas bar attendant or burger-flipper
as a temporary stopgap. Once one is downgraded to a marginal job category, one's
availability will be measured henceforth against the norms of the new field, not the
old one, no matter how long or substantial one's experience, and one will never again
be allowed to reject a job of the new type as unsuitable.
3. Caregiving
The courts have confirmed beyond cavil that the illness exception to the availability
requirement in the Act applies only to the claimant's own illness, not to the illness of
a third party.8 8 The only thing I might add under this head is that the case law bears
85. Although disallowing the appeal, the Umpire in this case, who professed considerable sympathy
toward the claimant, reduced the period of disqualification from 12 to seven weeks. Providing yet
another illustration of the capacity of the system to produce and countenance inhumane results, the
Federal Court of Appeal in Canada (A.G.) v. Phung (1994), 178 N.R. 8, [19941 F.C.J. No. 1754
(C.A.) (QL), set aside this reduction on the grounds that neither Boards nor Umpires have the power
to exercise discretionary powers specifically conferred on the Commission.
86. CUB 15680 (Sicoli, 1988); CUB 17907 (Shewpal, 1990). In both of these cases, the Umpire finds
that the Board made an error of law. It is clear from the decisions, however, that, absent technical
blunders, a decision like this could very easily be unchallengeable.
87. CUB 16051. We find a similar fact situation and a similar result in CUB 17592 (Barbato, 1989),
where the claimant was narrowly categorized as a pizza cook on the basis of her last job and
disqualified for undue restrictions when she said she did not want to work at night.
88. The most recent reaffirmation of this principle was in Canada (A.G.) v. Faltermeier (1995), 128
D.L.R. (4') 481, 187 N.R. 305 (F.C.A.), rev'g CUB 25001 (Faltermeier). For a discussion of this
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out what was said earlier about caregiving being disproportionately problematic for
older workers. It is notable that of the caregiving-related cases turned up in the
availability search, there were as many or more involving the care of spouses or parents
as of children. 89 A review ofjust cause cases involving caregiving, moreover, yielded
an even more striking result. In a sample of 20 CUBs compiled from references in the
Annotated Statute,90 there were six involving sick adults and not one involving sick
children. Since all family members have the same status under s. 29(c)(v) - which
lists the obligation to care for a relation as a circumstance justifying leaving an
employment - this imbalance may indicate either that sick adults actually cause more
work interruptions than sick children, or that adjudicators are likely to be less
understanding about the former, or both. Whatever the answer to that question, the
implication is the same: the exclusion of third parties from the illness exception may
well have more negative ramifications for older workers than for younger ones.
4. Disability
Unsurprisingly, given the ambiguity and incoherence observed in the Commission's
policy around disability issues, as articulated in the Digest (see section A.2 above),
some of the most troubling availability cases involve individuals who, due to health
conditions, are unable to continue in their previous lines of work. Because of the particular
salience of this issue for older workers, it is worth looking at some of these cases
individually. From the standpoint of the prevalence of this problem, it should be noted
that these are not the only cases of this nature in this sample, only the most striking ones.
CUB 5849 (Diamond, 1979) - The claimant, a park superintendent, left his job when
he was diagnosed with angina pectoris. The prognosis at the time was that he was
permanently disabled. Later, however, his condition improved, and he began looking for
light work. When he applied for El benefits, despite a letter from his doctor testifying to
the change, and despite evidence of extensive job search activities, the majority of the
Board held, on the basis of the initial diagnosis, that he was not available for work.
Although acknowledging that he might have concluded differently himself, the Umpire finds
nothing in the record that would justify interfering with the Board's findings of fact.
"[T]he chances of obtaining employment are external factors and are appreciated in the
light of the labour market information supplied at times by the Commission itself and by
the claimant's unsuccessful ... [though] genuine search for work."
case, see McGregor, "Anti Claimant Bias in the Employment Insurance Appeals System", supra note
26.
89. Cases involving care of a sick child included Canada (A.G.) v. Faltermeier, ibid; CUB 12871A
(Wood, 1987); CUB 19162 (Mitchell, 1991); CUB 25057 (Sarkis, n.d.); and CUB 46169 (Mitchell,
1999). Cases involving care of a sick adult included Canada (A.G.) v. White (1996), 137 D.L.R. (4' h)
566, 199 N.R. 221 (F.C.A.); CUB 12606 (Chilton, 1986); CUB 17798 (Pietkiewicz, 1990), CUB
20418 (Morehouse, n.d.); CUB 25446 (Guymer, 1994); and CUB 32071 (Hillgrove, 1995). In
Donohue v. Canada (A.G.), [1998] F.C.J. No. 935 (F.C.A.) (QL), there is not enough information
provided in either the court decision or the CUB to determine the identity of the ailing individual.
90. Supra note 70.
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CUB 11288 (Barrett, 1985) - At the time of his initial application, the claimant
indicated that he was not available for work due to a medical disability. Two months
later, he submitted a letter from his doctor stating that he was sufficiently recovered
to permit partial work. His reporting cards for the next few months indicated that he
was working part-time while looking for full-time employment of a light nature. At
the end of this period the Commission retroactively disentitled him on the basis that
the part-time job was as much as he was capable of handling, and he was therefore
not available for anything more. In endorsing this decision, the Board placed more
emphasis on the restrictions noted in the initial medical evidence than on the
claimant's testimony about his capabilities. On appeal, the Umpire found that it had
not committed any error in law.
CUB 16559 (Graham, 1988) - The claimant, who had worked as a welder for a
shipbuilder for 18 years, left his employment because of chronic pulmonary disease.
When his medical benefits ran out, although warned by his doctor that he was unfit
for work, he registered with his union hiring hall indicating that he was seeking a less
arduous position as a storeman. Despite this, both the Commission and the Board
determined that he was not available. The Umpire saw no reason to intervene. Because
of its rather dire implications about judicial thinking around this issue, it is worth
quoting the pertinent passage in his decision. "Labour Market information indicated
that at his age and in his state of health his opportunities for employment ... were
severely limited. He only wanted to work until he retired in any event even if he had
the capability. It was up to [his former employer] to decide whether they would offer
him this work and they did not. They were not obliged to do so, and his willingness
to work is insufficient in law to prove availability and capability."
CUB 18783 (McDougall, 1990) - The claimant, a 59-year-old registered nurse, left
her employment because of declining health. A certificate from her doctor indicated
that she was "no longer able to perform general nursing duties because of medical
problems. She would be able to do light duty work only." When interviewed by a
Commission agent, the claimant clarified this opinion by stating that although she did
not feel capable of returning to full-time shift work as a staff nurse in a hospital, she
was available for other kinds of nursing, preferably day work on a part-time basis up
to 24 hours weekly. Subsequent to this admission, she was disentitled for placing
undue restrictions on her availability. Although the Umpire allowed the appeal on other
grounds, he did not address the issue of whether her health-related limitations did, in
fact, constitute a restriction. By ignoring this aspect, the decision leaves open the
possibility that if she were offered a full-time job that she was unable to take, she
would be disqualified.
CUB 23929 (Veinot, 1994) - The claimant was forced to leave her job as a cleaner
because of arthritis in her back. The file contained two letters from her doctor. The
first said that she was unable to work; the second that she was able to return to
employment if it did not entail any heavy physical activity. Four months after the initial
claim was established, the Commission imposed a retroactive disqualification and
levied a $1600 overpayment. In issuing its decision on appeal, the Board accepted the
respondent's argument that the second letter should be treated as less credible than
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the first since it was written after the claimant received notice of her disqualification.
The fact that she offered evidence of a job search was not considered as significant.
"Although I have considerable sympathy for Mrs. Veinot's position," said the Umpire,
"I do not find that the Board of Referees erred in its decision."
A disturbing pattern emerges when we look at these cases as a group. If a claimant
limits his or her search to something appropriate to his or her reduced capabilities
(like MacDougall), s/he may be penalized for undue restrictions. If s/he looks for work
that the Commission does not believe he or she can handle (Diamond, Barrett,
Graham, Veinot), s/he faces disqualification for non-availability. Exacerbating matters
is the fact that capability is a slippery concept that tends to merge with de facto
employability. The language in at least some of these decisions (Diamond, Graham)
comes very close to saying that not being able to find a job is evidence that one is not
available for work. That adjudicators should think like this has implications well
beyond the special field of disability. If a person is unable to secure employment
because of prejudice on the part of employers, despite being fully capable of doing
jobs that are on the market, does that mean that he or she is unavailable?
This last point raises a more technical consideration. Since the problems in these
particular cases were not pre-existing conditions but lately developed ones which
precipitated the claimant's job loss, they fall under the circumstances described in
section 10.10.3 of the Digest as legitimate factors to consider in determining
availability. As I suggested earlier, however, I do not believe that there is any legal
justification for making this distinction. Regardless of the particular instrument, it is
good law that, barring some bonafide justification (which will rarely be found absent
either impossibility or undue hardship 91), discriminating in the provision of services
to the public on the basis of disability, regardless of how or when the condition was
contracted, is illegal. While the issue appears not to have been specifically considered
by the courts (as I have discussed elsewhere, Charter questions are typically either
ignored in El cases 92), it seems only common sense that penalizing someone for
seeking an alternative form of employment to accommodate a reduced capacity would
fall within prohibited conduct.
B. Comments and Observations
What are we to make of these examples? At the very least, they demonstrate that the
discriminatory impact I have imputed to the Act is not merely potential. Looking at
the advantage that has been taken of client handicaps in these cases, in fact, one might
91. The relevant clause in the Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 for instance, is s. 15(2):
"For any practice ... to be considered to have a bona fide justification, if must be established that
accommodation of the needs of an individual or a class of individuals affected would impose undue
hardship on the person who would have to accommodate those needs, considering health, safety and
cost." In a few of these cases - like Graham, perhaps - it is conceivable that the Commission could
argue that the claimant's health would be endangered if it encouraged him to continue with a job search.
As far as cost is concerned, though, it seems unlikely, given the current size of the El surplus, that the
government could establish that accommodating these few individuals would be fiscally catastrophic.
92. "Lesiuk versus the Employment Insurance Commission," supra note 33.
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reach the same conclusion suggested by our field study of the Toronto implementation
regime - that if there is any possibility of interpreting a provision against a claimant,
such that money is saved or obligations are minimized, administrators are likely to do
so. More troubling, however, is what they suggest about the chances of remedying -
or gaining individual recourse for - these discriminatory elements through the normal
complaints process. Part of the problem, obviously, is the rather rigid insistence on
the rule of law. An even bigger part, however, is the extent to which the appeals process
reproduces rather than compensates for biases in the legislation. And notjust because,
as I have discussed elsewhere, the way the system is set up gives a practical advantage
to the respondent.93
There is considerable if somewhat subtle evidence in this body of case law that EI
adjudicators' views are coloured by the same ageist stereotypes that make it difficult
for older workers to find employment in the first place. In many of the disability cases
discussed in the last section, for instance, there was a clear disinclination to believe
that the individuals were really looking for work. One finds a similar disinclination
in other types of job search cases. In CUB 23426 (Armitage, 1994), where the job
preference listed on an initial application form was used to prove that an unemployed
long-time teacher was unduly restricting her availability, despite ample evidence to
the contrary, part of the reason why the Board was suspicious of claims about the
appellant's readiness to take work outside her field was the extent of her education
and experience. In CUB 22947 (Hegyi, 1993), similarly, a Board refused to believe
that a 63-year-old former building superintendent had lowered his initial expectations
vis-A-vis salary and job type, again despite evidence, because they were convinced
that he was not prepared to take work outside of his chosen occupation. While there
may be good reason to suspect, on common sense grounds, that a claimant who faces
some kind of detriment in taking a job - whether in terms of lost status or of physical
discomfort or of diminished returns for effort expended - is less likely to be
wholehearted about the prospect, there is no legal justification for holding such
individuals to a higher standard of proof than others. More to the point, there is no
legal justification for providing such individuals with a lower standard of support than
others, not just in absolute terms but calculated as a ratio of actual need.
That El penalizes difference is not just an older worker issue, of course. Many of the
problems elucidated in the foregoing pages apply to other constituencies besides this
one. Indeed, based on the evidence, one might say that the EI regime is biassed against
any group that faces greater than average barriers to employment. I have talked
elsewhere about public law remedies for this situation. 94 Granted that the internal
appeals system does not offer much relief, this fact in itself may provide good grounds
for judicial review. And certainly many of the effects I have talked about would be
93. Particularly troublesome is the fact that it is the Commission itself, a party to the appeals, which is
empowered to make the ground rules, train the referees, and administer the procedures. For a full
discussion of these problems, see McGregor, "Anti-Claimant Bias in the Employment Insurance
System," supra note 26.
94. Ibid.
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vulnerable to human rights complaints, especially in the wake of B.C.G.S.E.U v.
British Columbia (Meiorin),95 with its enshrinement of the concept of anticipatory
accommodation and its insistence on individualized treatment.96 As far as older
workers in particular are concerned, however, it should not be left to the victims to
search out solutions. If the government really is interested in re-normalizing a longer
work life - and self-interest dictates that it must be - then fixing the anti-age elements
in the ELA is not altruism but necessity.
95. [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3, 176 D.L.R. (4 th) 1.
96. Considering the defence of "reasonable necessity", the Court in this case formulated the principle
that accommodation is not just a post facto bandaid to be applied by an employer when confronted
with evidence that its rules are discriminatory, as was the case previously; it is something that must
actually be built into the rules. How would the EI regime measure up to this standard? One quibble
that might be raised would concern the applicability of the precedent. It is notable that Meiorin
involved employment testing - what we are dealing with in El is a service to the public. Despite its
facial plausibility, it is unlikely that such an argument would wash. In the context of human rights
law, principles are not generally attached to specific subject matters. Most codes contain a concept of
bona fide justification which is not only notionally parallel to bonafide occupational requirement in
the employment arena, but is applied using a specifically parallel form of analysis (see i.e., Floyd v.
CEIC (1993), 3/93 (F.C.T.D.)). Adding weight in this particular case, moreover, is the practical
artificiality of the distinction. Employment insurance may technically be a service, but it also has a
number of distinctly employment-like features. Benefit payments are viewed as replacing
"earnings". Beneficiaries are expected to "work" at finding a job. Most significantly, entitlement is
determined on the ability of the applicant to meet certain tests. Some of these are purely factual -
how long a person has worked, where s/he resides, what circumstances led to the loss of
employment. Others, however - like attachment and availability - are clearly connected with the
efforts, attitudes, and capabilities of the individual. Just like employment tests. With these
similarities, it is not much of a stretch to conclude that legal principles applicable to one field should
also be applicable to the other. A more serious counter would be the claim that the Commission's
modus is already based on individual assessment. "[A]vailability is a question of fact to be
considered in reference to the particular circumstances of each case," says the Digest of Benefit
Entitlement Principles (supra note 31 at s. 10.4.0). One thing Meiorin makes clear, however, is that
the mere fact that an assessment process is individualized does not make it acceptable. "The Court of
Appeal ... suggested that the fact that Ms. Meiorin was tested individually immunized the
Government from a finding of discrimination. However, individual testing, without more, does not
negate discrimination. The individual must be tested against a realistic standard that reflects his or
her capacities and potential contributions" (para 82; emphasis added). Viewed in this light, it seems
unlikely that the Commission's policy of disentitling people whose job prospects are limited due to
health problems (discrimination on the ground of disability) or care giving obligations
(discrimination on the ground of family status) or stereotypes about declining capacity
(discrimination on the ground of age) could pass muster. At the very least, the government would be
required to provide concrete reasons why it would be infeasible for it to vary its blanket policies - by
giving more time, or by allowing the claimant to put appropriate restrictions on his/her job search, for
instance, or even by providing special programs to help get applicants into suitably modified work
situations - in order to accommodate these individual differences.
